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Appellees and Cross-Appellants, including Steve S. Christensen (Christensen), 
through counsel, hereby submit their initial brief, supporting their cross-appeal and 
responding to the arguments presented by Appellant Charles C. Rehn (Rehn). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellees present their issues, on cross-appeal, for this Court's consideration. 
Appellees then comment on Rehn's framing of the issues and propose alternate phrasing. 
I. APPELLEES' ISSUES 
Issue 1: 
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Rehn on 
the first two elements of slander of title (publication of a false statement slandering title1) 
where Rehn's ownership of the property in question was connected to Christensen's 
representation of Rehn in the divorce and where evidence that Rehn had agreed to a 
consensual lien was undisputed. 
1. Standard of Review. Utah's appellate courts review summary judgments for 
correctness, giving no deference to the lower court's conclusions of law. Dillon v. S. Mgmt. 
Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 21, 326 P.3d 656. "Rather, [they] review de novo 
whether the record shows that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Id (quoting U.R.C.P. 56( c)). 
Summary judgments may be affirmed on alternative grounds. Id Courts are to view "the 
1 See Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36, 326 P.3d 656. 
1 
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facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Orois v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,I 6, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting another source). 
2. Preservation. Appellees filed a memorandum opposing Rehn's motion for 
summary judgment. R. 675-760. Key portions of the memorandum are located at R. 690, 
702-03, and 707. In its ruling, the district court accounted for arguments about both a 
statutory attorney lien and a consensual lien. R 1957. 
Issue 2: 
Whether the district court erred in denying Appellees' motion for a directed verdict 
on the third element of slander of title (malice2) where Rehn failed to produce evidence that 
Christensen knew that Appellees' lien was false and unenforceable. 
1. Standard of Review. "Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion 
for directed verdict for correctness." Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, ,r 6. 
(citation omitted). This Court affirms denials of directed verdicts "when a review of the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party demonstrates that 'reasonable 
minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict."' Id. (quoting another 
source). 
2. Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 3945:122-24. The topic was also 
addressed at the summary judgment stage. R. 708-09. 
Issue 3: 
Whether the district court erred in denying Appellees' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, new trial, where the jury awarded Rehn 
2 Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. &tirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36. 
2 
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$77,752.29 in slander of title damages not only for attorney fees he incurred to remove 
Appellees' lien by initiating this case, obtaining a preliminary injunction, and prevailing on 
summary judgment,3 but also for attorney fees he incurred in relation to the following 
matters: bankruptcy remedies, bar complaints, wrongful lien, civil conspiracy, intentional 
interference with economic relations, promissory estoppel, permanent injunctions, equitable 
estoppel, and a failed motion to strike Christensen's declaration. 
1. Standard of Review. "[A] district court may grant aJNOV motion only if 
there is no 'basis in the evidence, inc;:luding reasonable inferences which could be drawn 
therefrom, to support the jury's determination."' ASCUTAH, Inc. v. Wo!f Mountain Resorts, 
LC, 2013 UT 24, ,r 18, 309 P.3d 201 (quoting Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 
997, 999 (Utah 1996)). Utah appellate courts "review rulings on JNOV motions for 
correctness." Id. (citing Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). A 
district court's denial of a motion for a new trial is reversed "only if there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision." Id. ,r 21 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 
1991). 
2. Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 3656-75, 3865-69. The JNOV 
motion was related to a motion for directed verdict made at trial. R. 3945:125, 127. In 
moving for that directed verdict, Appellees were essentially renewing their second motion 
for summary judgment. R. 1997-99. 
3 The first summary judgment ruling disposed of the lien and Appellees' attempt to enforce 
it. R. 1955-59. 
3 
GL,, 
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II. COMMENTS ON AND REPHRASING OF REHN'S ISSUES 
Issue 1: 
Rehn's phrasing of his first issue exaggerates the connection between Rehn prevailing 
on his tort claim and Rehn defeating Appellees' contract-based counterclaim. The phrasing 
incorrectly implies that the claims were mutually exclusive and resolved simultaneously. In 
reality, the district court refused to extend the reciprocal attorney fee statute to a situation 
wherein Rehn incurred attorney fees to pursue a one-sided tort claim beyond the summary 
judgment ruling that had quieted title to Rehn's property and dismissed Appellees' sole 
counterclaim. R. 3721-24. Admittedly, after summary judgment, Appellees referred to the 
contract's existence to show a lack of malice. But Appellees did not pursue further contract 
claims. 
Therefore, Rehn' s first issue on appeal is more appropriately phrased as follows: 
Whether the district court correctly refused to extend the reciprocal attorney fee statute to 
attorney fees incurred in litigation wherein neither party relied on the contract between them 
as a basis for recovery. 
Issue 2: 
The jury awarded Rehn most of the attorney fees he had incurred prior to the 
summary judgment quieting Rehn's title and dismissing Appellees' contractual counterclaim. 
See R. 3656-75. Hence, Rehn's request for an equitable award of attorney fees is for fees 
incurred to pursue his slander of title tort claim. Appellees' subsequent efforts were only to 
defend against a slander of title judgment and not as ''litigation to force [Rehn] into 
capitulating to paying off the falsified lien." 
4 
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Appropriately trimmed down, Rehn' s second issue on appeal is thus: Whether the 
district court, in refusing to award Rehn attorney fees on an equitable basis, abused its 
discretion by failing to consider as a factor that the party held liable for slandering plaintiff's 
title was plaintiff's attorney when he slandered plaintiff's title. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (Addendum 1) 
Utah Code Ann.§§ 38-12-102 & 103 (Addendum 2) 
Utah Code Ann~§ 78B-5-826 (Addendum 3) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
On cross-appeal, Appellees appeal the district court's final judgment and underlying 
rulings. Appellees also appeal the district court's denial of their motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or new trial. Rehn is appealing the district court's refusal to 
award him the attorney fees incurred to pursue his tort action. 
II. DISPOSITION BELOW 
The case commenced below on February 15, 2013, with Rehn's complaint, which 
alleged five causes of action against Appellees arising from an Appellee recording a notice of 
lien on Rehn's property. R. 1-109. Appellees answered and counterclaimed for enforcement 
of the underlying lien. R. 313-52. On summary judgment, Rehn prevailed on his declaratory 
relief and against Appellees' counterclaim. R. 3616-20, 1955-59. At trial, Rehn prevailed on 
his slander of title claims. R. 3616-20. Rehn's other claims, aside from his unsuccessful post-
5 
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trial motion for an· award of attorney fees, were mooted, dismissed, or withdrawn and are 
not at issue on appeal. Id. 
Rehn prevailed on his declaratory relief claim at summary judgment. R. 1955-59, 
Addendum 4. The summary judgment ruling construed Rehn's declaratory relief claim as a 
quiet title claim, invalidated Appellees' lien, released $40,000 that was held in escrow to 
Rehn, and dismissed Appellees' counterclaim for enforcement of the lien. R. 1955-59, 3618. 
On summary judgment, Rehn established the first and second elements of slander of 
title-publication of a false and slanderous statement. R. 1955-59. The remaining two 
elements, malice and damages, were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in 
Rehn's favor. R. 3616-20, Addendum 5. The jury concluded that Rehn had suffered 
$77,752.29 in damages. Id. The $77,752.29 purportedly represented attorney fees that were 
reasonably necessary to remove Appellees' lien.4 R. 3656-75. 
After trial, Appellees moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, 
arguing that the damages award was inappropriate because many of the fees were for 
unrelated matters, for unspecified matters, or plainly excessive. R. 3656-7 5, Addendum 6. 
The district court denied this motion. R. 3865-69, Addendum 7. 
Also after trial, the district court denied Rehn' s motion for attorney fees incurred to 
carry the slander of title claim beyond termination of Appellees' lien and dismissal of 
Appellees' counterclaim. R. 3721-24, Addendum 8. 
4 The district court's initial summary judgment order terminated any and all rights Appellees 
may have had under the lien. R. 1955-59. 
6 
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III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In 1995, Rehn consulted Christensen regarding filing a divorce. R. 3945:19-20. 
Around June 1996, Rehn retained the law firm of Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC") 
to represent him in a divorce, with Christensen acting as lead counsel. R. 689. During the 
proceedings, Rehn soµght advice from Christensen regarding the marital home, known as 
the "Saddleback Property." R. 715. At the time, Rehn was leasing the Saddleback Property. 
R. 679. Rehn consulted with Christensen about the possibility of purchasing the Saddleback 
Property. R. 715. Specifically, Rehn wondered how his potential purchase of the property 
would affect the divorce distribution. R. 715. Christensen advised that a purchase prior to 
entry of the divorce decree would bring the property within the jurisdiction of the divorce 
court-particularly if Rehn used marital funds to make the purchase. R. 715. In light of 
Rehn's overall goals, Christensen advised Rehn to buy the property post-divorce. R. 715. 
Thereafter, the divorce decree entered near September 1997. R. 689. Subsequently, in 
February 2000, Rehn purchased the Saddleback Property, achieving the pre-divorce goal of 
living in the marital residence post-divorce. R. 679. 
For purposes of appealing the divorce, Rehn again hired HNC (with Christensen as 
lead attorney), signing a representation agreement on October 24, 1997. R. 689. Appellees 
asserted that the agreement granted HNC a contractual lien on Rehn's residence and real 
property.5 R. 690. 
5 Below, the district court construed Appellees' pleadings as judicially admitting that no 
contractual right to a lien existed. R. 1957. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On or about June 30, 1998, while Rehn's appeal was pending, HNC was dissolved.6 
R. 690. Immediately thereafter, on July 1, 1999, Christensen formed a new law firm, Steve S. 
Christensen, P.C. ("SSC"). R. 690. The HNC partners assigned the right to collect Rehn's 
unpaid fees to SSC. R. 690.7 Rehn asked Christensen to continue pursuing the appeal on his 
behalf and did not object to the fact that Christensen was continuing work on the appeal as 
an employee of SSC. R. 690. 
Rehn was not ignorant of the fact that he had become a client of SSC. See R. 691. On 
November 18, 1999, SSC sent a letter to Rehn informing Rehn that Christensen's billing rate 
had increased to $120 per hour. R. 691. Rehn did not object to the increased fee or complain 
that SSC was billing him for services rendered. R. 691. SSC mailed another letter regarding a 
fee increase on November 8, 2000. R. 691. Once again, Rehn did not object. R. 691. 
Meanwhile, SSC sent Rehn monthly billing statements regarding fees and interest on fees 
Rehn owed for services performed by both SSC and HNC. R. 691. Rehn paid some of the 
amounts SSC billed. R. 716. 
By June 30, 2001, Rehn owed approximately $26,000 in fees and interest for legal 
services related to the divorce case, appeal, and remand. R. 692. 8 
6 HNC ceased doing business on June 30, 1998. The appellate court rendered its decision, 
later, on February 19, 1999. Seegeneral/y &hn v. R.ehn, 1999 UT App 041, 974 P.2d 306. 
7 The assignment was oral and not placed in writing until shortly before Rehn filed his 
complaint. R. 3944:198. 
8 Rehn owed Appellees an additional $830 for Christensen's assistance on a small matter 
known as the Hertz matter and unrelated to the divorce or divorce appeal. R. 3944:239. No 
new agreement was signed for the Hertz matter. R. 3944:233-34. 
8 
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On July 20, 2001, Christensen, an authorized agent of SSC, prepared, signed, and 
subsequently caused to be recorded an Amended Notice of Attorney Lien (the "Notice") on 
the Saddle back Property in the amount of $26,807.14, plus interest. See R. 346. · 
There were a number of mistakes in the text of the Notice, largely stemming from 
Christensen using a template to draft the Notice. R. 3944:240. The template came from an 
amended notice of attorney lien, and in drafting the Notice for Rehn's property, Christensen 
failed to remove the word "amended" from the title. R. 3944:240-41. In using the template, 
Christensen also failed to update the citation to the attorney lien statute to reflect that as of a 
few months prior to Christensen drafting the Notice, Utah Code § 38-2-7 had replaced § 78-
51-41 as controlling attorney liens. R. 3944:194-95. Another problem in the Notice stemmed 
from Christensen placing the property description into the first paragraph of template and 
failing to realize both that the language in the first paragraph delved into the lien's basis and 
focused solely on property that was the subject of the representation and did not account for 
the law allowing attorney liens to also attach to property connected to the representation. 
R. 3944:241-42. 
The notice also conflated billing for the Hertz matter with Rehn' s divorce and appeal 
billing statements and erroneously stated in the Notice that Rehn owed approximately 
$26,800 in relation to his divorce instead of approximately only $26,000. R 3944:241-42. 
Rehn also claimed an error in the Notice that Rehn had employed Christensen 
beginning in 1995, rather than 1996. R. 3944:290. However, on the witness stand, Rehn 
confessed that he and Christensen had met about the divorce in 1995. R. 3945:19. 
9 
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In August 2001, the monthly invoice Appellees sent to Rehn contruned a notation 
regarding the recording of the lien. R. 3944:170-71. On September 26, 2001, SSC sent a 
copy of the Notice to Rehn. R. 692. In the letter, SSC stated, 
Now that you are back working, you indicated you will be able to make 
arrangements to pay off your attorney's fees with this firm. You discussed 
possibly taking out a home equity loan to do that. I am told by lenders that 
you are able to withdraw a higher percentage of your equity if the money is to 
refinance existing obligations rather than to obtrun cash for yourself In the 
event that it would be helpful, I have filed the enclosed attorney's lien for your 
use in a refinance. If it turns out that this lien will not be useful to you, I can 
release the lien.9 
R. 753. Rehn received the September 26, 2001, letter and copy of the Notice. R. 692. 
Subsequently, Rehn and Christensen met on January 15, 2002, to discuss Rehn's 
unpaid attorney fees. R. 692. Rehn requested that SSC refrrun from charging him interest for 
six months and allow him to pay $125 per month in exchange for a lien against all of Rehn's 
estate, including future assets and inheritances. R. 692. Christensen memorialized the 
resulting agreement in a letter he sent to Rehn on January 15, 2002, which included the 
following paragraph: 
You also agree guarantee [ sic] payment to me from your current assets, the 
assets of your estate, the assets of any trust, life insurance and/ or any other 
instrument established by your hold to your assets. By this guarantee, you 
instruct your personal representative to pay your obligation to me as one of 
the debts of your estate. You also agree to give me the right to collect from 
any of the beneficiaries of your estate or assets at or after the time of the gift, 
devise or bequest or from the buyer of any of your property. However, this 
guarantee cannot be used to collect money from you except at the time you 
sell or give away any of your current assets or at the time of your death. 
R. 756-57. 
9 Throughout the proceedings, Rehn has asserted that "I can release the lien" somehow 
means "I will release the lien if you merely request me to do so." But, this is not what that 
sentence says. 
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The agreement made forbearance of interest contingent on Rehn's making timely 
payments of at least $125 per month. See id. 
Although Rehn did not return a signed copy of the document to SSC, R. 693, he did 
not object to its terms orally or in writing, either. R. 693. In accordance with the agreement, 
SSC refrained from charging Rehn interest for six months and did not attempt to directly 
collect any additional money from Rehn during that time. R. 693. SSC also refrained from 
judicial attempts to collect money from Rehn personally. R. 693. As contemplated by the 
agreement, Rehn also made one or two payments in the amount of$125. R. 3944:249. 
On February 13, 2002, SSC again sent a copy of the Notice to Rehn, giving notice to 
Rehn that SSC had not released the lien. R. 693. In the following eleven years, Rehn did not 
ask one time for Christensen to remove the lien. R. 3944:252. 
Although Rehn subsequently received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge of his 
personal obligations, he did not file any motion or action in the bankruptcy court challenging 
the validity, nature, or extent of Appellees' lien. See R. 694. The bankruptcy court did not 
enter an order avoiding the lien, and Rehn admitted as much in discovery. R. 694. Indeed, at 
trial, Rehn testified that he and his bankruptcy attorney decided not to worry about the lien 
based on their interpretation of the letter where SSC stated that he could release the lien to 
facilitate the refinance Rehn had proposed to pay the attorney fees. R 3944:293. 
For the eleven years between September 26, 2001, and January 13, 2013, Rehn did 
not object to SSC recording the Notice. R. 694. During that time, he did not ask for the lien 
to be removed, suggest that the lien could not attach to the Saddleback Property, or allege 
that it was wrongful or illegal. R. 694. 
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Rehn did not ever challenge the lien until he attempted to sell his house. R. 3944:272. 
Ultimately, he initiated the proceedings below. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellees' Issue 1: 
Addressing Rehn's slander of title claim, the district court, on partial summary 
judgment, erroneously ruled that Appellees had published a false statement slandering 
Rehn's title to the Saddleback Property. Despite scrivener's errors in the notice of lien, 
Appellees held a valid attorney's lien and/ or a consensual lien against Rehn's property. This 
Court should reverse this harmful error. 
The existence of an attorney's lien is automatic as per the attorney's lien statute. 
Attorney's liens apply to property that is both the subject of the representation or connected 
with the representation. In Sumsion, the connection between land on which a worker's 
compensation incident occurred and the worker's compensation litigation was noted as 
being plausible. 
An attorney's lien exists regardless of attempts to enforce it in court or to file a notice 
of lien. The attorney's lien statute does not address improper notice, but improper notice 
does not invalidate similar statutory liens. 
Appellees held a valid attorney's lien because Rehn's property was connected to 
Christensen's representation of Rehn in Rehn's divorce. At one point, Rehn consulted 
Christensen about potential purchase of the property and the effect on the divorce. Further, 
the property had been the marital home, even if only by lease. Admittedly, the notice of lien 
contained a number of inaccuracies, caused by Christensen using a template to draft the lien. 
12 
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Regardless, Appellees' attorney's lien existed and the notice gave to the world an accurate 
description of the land, the parties, the underlying action, the agreement between the parties, 
and the approximate amount of the lien. The scrivener's errors in the Notice did not cause 
the lien to cease to exist. 
Appellees notice of lien was further justified because they held a consensual lien as 
per a retainer agreement. The district court erroneously concluded that Appellees had 
judicially admitted in their pleadings that no consensual lien existed. Further, all pleadings 
should be construed to do substantial justice, and the whole effect of a pleading should be 
considered. 
Although Appellees correctly admitted that "there is no signed agreement between 
SSC and Rehn," they were not asked if HNC and Rehn had a signed agreement. Appellees 
quoted and alleged a consensual lien in that same pleading. The district court should not 
have construed that pleading as a judicial admission that there was no consensual lien. 
Additionally, a slander of title is an unfounded claim of interest in the property. The 
assertion that a lien exists is the key assertion for slander of title. The misstatements in the 
notice should not give rise to a slander of title claim where a lien exists. 
Because a different ruling by the district court would have led to Appellees' avoiding 
a slander of title judgment or otherwise being able to present their case on these issues, the 
district court's ruling is harmful, reversible error. 
Appellees' Issue 2: 
The district court should have granted Appellees' motion for a directed verdict on the 
issue of malice because Rehn failed to establish that Christensen acted with malice. 
13 
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Regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks to establish actual or implied malice, the plaintiff 
must establish that the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements at issue were 
false. 
In Dillon, the defendant had asserted its loss of lien rights as a basis for another 
lawsuit. Thus, the Dillon defendant acted with malice because it affirmatively knew that its 
lien rights were gone. In Banberry Crossing, the defendant, through more due diligence, 
probably could have ascertained that there was no valid lien, but because he did not actually 
know, he did not act with malice. 
In this case, Rehn established that Appellees made several scrivener's errors and 
ascribed the worst sort of intentions to Christensen, thus swaying the jury to find malice. 
However, Rehn failed to present evidence showing that Christensen had actual knowledge 
that he held no right to a lien against Rehn's property. Indeed, Christensen was not aware he 
held no lien until the district court imposed a narrow interpretation of the attorney lien 
statute and a broad interpretation of Appellees' admissions in their pleadings in support of 
its determination on summary judgment. Admittedly, Rehn established that Christensen 
knew there were some scrivener's errors in the notice of lien, but Rehn did not produce 
evidence that Christensen knew he had no lien against Rehn's property. The district court's 
failure to grant the directed verdict on malice is harmful and reversible error because it 
resulted in a judgment against Christensen. 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellees' Issue 3: 
The district court incorrectly denied Appellees' motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. The amount of damages the jury awarded Rehn far exceeded the amount of 
attorney fees reasonably necessary for Rehn to remove Appellees' lien. 
In slander of title cases, attorney fees may be awarded as damages if reasonably 
necessary to remedy the improper disparagement of the plaintiffs title. Utah case law 
defining "reasonably necessary" is scarce. Appellees propose that to be reasonably necessary, 
attorney fees should be reasonable in amount and incurred to pursue of reasonable method 
of remedying disparagement of title-like a quiet title action. Though Utah case law is not 
extensive, it does clearly establish that attorney fees incurred to pursue a slander of title claim 
are per se ineligible to be awarded as part of the damages in a slander of title action. Utah 
case law requires a showing of necessity and specificity and thus aligns with the result in a 
Maine case in which the quiet title counts were the only portions of a multi-claim lawsuit for 
which attorney fees could be properly awarded. 
At trial, Rehn and one of his attorneys testified that nearly $80,000 was reasonably 
necessary to carry Rehn's case from his hiring his attorneys to quieting title on summary 
judgment. Although the testimony provides a basis to support the jury's award, some 
portions of that amount were, as a matter of law, not reasonably necessary to remedy the 
disparagement of title. The jury's award included fees Rehn incurred to pursue slander of 
title and many other avenues of offense against Appellees, including bar complaints and 
bankruptcy sanctions, the natural result of which could not directly quiet title and thus could 
not be reasonable necessary to remedy disparagement of title. Rehn further failed to specify 
15 
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for what matters many of his fees were incurred. Additionally, Rehn incurred nearly $8,000 
on a failed motion to strike Christensen's declaration. The district court should have granted 
Appellees' JNOV motion. Because failure to do so left the judgment in favor of Rehn 
unreduced, the error constitutes harmful, reversible error. 
Rehn's Issue 1: 
The reciprocal attorney fee statute does not apply to Rehn's pursuit of a slander of 
title tort claim against Appellees beyond the summary judgment ruling quieting Rehn's title 
and dismissing Appellees' counterclaim. 
The statute applies to actions based on contract. An action is based on contract if the 
contract's enforceability is alleged as a basis for recovery. The attorney fees from reciprocal 
awards under the statute must be allocated--or separated-from attorney fees incurred to 
pursue causes of action for which no attorney fee award is permissible. 
Between the summary judgment quieting title and dismissing Appellees' counterclaim 
and the resolution of Rehn's slander of title claim, no party asserted contract as a basis for 
recovery. Indeed, Rehn's slander of title claim relied on there being no enforceable contract. 
And, Appellees' assertion that a contract existed could only prove lack of malice and could 
not result in a judgment for Appellees or any sort of recovery. 
Rehn's Issue 2: 
The American Rule provides that each party bears their own expenses unless a statute 
or contract provides to the contrary. Further, equity follows the law and should not be used 
as a way to circumvent established law such as the American Rule. A district court may 
award attorney fees on an equitable basis in extenuating circumstances. However, a district 
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court is also free to refuse to make such an award. The Utah Supreme Court has granted 
district courts considerable latitude and exceedingly broad discretion in these matters. The 
district court is in the best position to judge the equities. 
Rehn argues that the district court ignored the fact that Rehn was Christensen's client 
when Christensen first recorded the notice of lien. Quite simply, the district court did 
consider this fact and no doubt weighed it against all testimony and other observations the 
district court made throughout the litigation. 
Further, there are a number of equities in favor of Appellees including that Rehn did 
incur the attorney fees knowingly, and the appeal he requested was completed without him 
paying for the work-the notice of lien was not based on an imaginary obligation. 
Attorney Fees on Appeal: 
Because Rehn is not entitled to attorney fees below, he is not entitled to attorney fees 
on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLEES' ISSUES 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE SLANDER OF TITLE 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLEES HELD AV ALID LIEN 
On summary judgment, the district court erroneously ruled that Rehn had established 
the first and second elements of slander of title (publication of a false and slanderous 
statement) based on its incorrect conclusion that Appellees held no attorney lien or 
consensual lien against Rehn's property. R. 1955-59. The district court should have ruled 
that Appellees held a valid attorney lien and a valid consensual lien. Further, the court should 
have concluded that Appellees had made no false statement disparaged title and dismissed 
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Rehn's slander of title claim. Alternatively, the district court should have concluded there 
was a dispute as to material facts and refrained from entering summary judgment on the first 
two elements of the slander of title claim. This Court should reverse the district court's 
erroneous decision because it was harmful to Appellees. 
A. Appellees held a valid attorney lien against Rehn. 
Appellees held a valid attorney lien against Rehn because there was a connection 
between Rehn's property and Christensen's representation of Rehn in the divorce and 
divorce appeal. Scrivener's errors in the notice of lien do not cause the lien to cease to exist. 
An "attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the attorney by the 
client," or in a domestic relations matter, where the client has failed to pay and either the 
attorney-client relationship has ended or a final order of divorce has been entered. Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-2-7(3), (11). An attorney's lien covers "money or property owned by the 
client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client .... " Id. § 38-2-
7(2). It is permissible for an attorney lien to stretch beyond property that was the direct 
subject of the work-the property need only be connected.10 See Bay Harbor Farm, LC v. 
Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, ~ 15,329 P.3d 46 (stating "the statute includes the phrase 
'connected with' in addition to the phrase 'the subject of,' indicating that the statute was 
meant to cover more than those cases where the land is the actual subject of the lawsuit"). 
For example, in Sumsion, this Court held that it would be plausible to find a connection 
10 Implicitly, U.C.A. § 38-2-7 suggests that the property subject to the attorney's lien need 
not be owned by the client at the earliest ti.me the lien may commence because the property 
that is the subject of the lawsuit becomes the client's property only by virtue of the 
subsequent judgment. Similarly, here, Rehn obtained alienable interest sometime after the 
divorce decree was entered. 
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between land on which a worker's compensation incident occurred and the worker's 
compensation claim itself. 
Any errors made in an attempt to enforce or give notice of an attorney's lien do not 
invalidate the lien. "A discrimination must be made between the things that are necessary to 
acquire a lien and those that are merely intended to protect the interests of'' other parties. See 
Utah Sav. & L,oanAss'n v. Mecham, 366 P.2d 598, 601-02 (Utah 1961). A close reading of 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 demonstrates that an attorney lien exists regardless of whether the 
attorney enforces it in court or files notice.11 It logically follows that an attorney lien exists 
even if attorneys enforcing or giving notice make scrivener's errors as they attempt to 
exercise their options to enforce or give notice. 
Moreover, pursuant to the canons of statutory construction, the procedures in the 
attorney lien statute for filing a notice of lien are not required to obtain a valid lien. To 
interpret a statute, courts look first at the statute's plain language. Otter Creek &serooir Co. v. 
New Escalante Irrigation Co., 2009 UT 16, ,r 14, 203 P.3d 1015. And, a statute's plain language 
must be read "as a whole" and "in harmony" with other statutory provisions in the same or 
related chapters. State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ,r 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (quoting another case). 
Reading the attorney's lien statute in harmony with related lien provisions, failure to 
follow the enforcement and notice procedures outlined in the statute do not invalidate an 
attorney lien. The attorney lien statute is part of Title 38 of the Utah Code, which governs all 
liens. U.C.A. § 38-2-7(5)-(6) addresses notice of an attorney's lien. U.C.A. § 38-12-102 
11 By statute, if the client is obliged to compensate the attorney, the attorney's lien exists by 
operation of law; enforcement or recording of notice is not necessary to create it. See U.C.A. 
§ 38-2-7 (2), ( 4)-(5). 
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outlines generic notice requirements. Comparing the two, the notice requirements for filing 
notices of attorney liens and for filing other notices of liens are functionally identical. 
Because they are functionally identical, it logically should follow that the legislature intended 
that they have the same legal effect. And, reading the attorney lien statute's notice 
requirements in light of the general lien notice statute's requirements reveals that the 
legislature did not intend to condition the validity of an attorney lien on following the 
statute's procedures. The attorney lien statute does not explain the effect of the failure to 
follow its notice procedures-or even prescribe a penalty. U.C.A. § 38-2-7. However, the 
general lien notice statute does prescribe a penalty without invalidating the lien: "Failure to 
meet ... notice requirements [of the general lien notice statute] does not ... invalidate any lien 
arising at common law or in equity or by any statute of this state; ... " Id. § 38-12-103(3). 
Inasmuch as the legislature did not intend to make following the general lien notice 
requirements a precondition to the validity of a lien, it would not have intended to make the 
attorney lien notice requirements, which are functionally identical to the general lien notice 
requirements, a precondition to the validity of an attorney lien. 
1. There was a connection between the properry and Christensen~ representation of 
"&hn in the divorce. 
As explained supra, during the divorce proceedings, Rehn sought advice from 
Christensen as to whether he should purchase the marital home, which he was then leasing.12 
R. 715. Apparently, it was Rehn's goal to live at that residence for the foreseeable future. 
Christensen advised that a purchase prior to entry of the divorce decree would bring the 
12 Admittedly, Rehn dispute that this conversation took place, but the standard of review 
requires facts to be construed in Appellee's favor. 
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property within the jurisdiction of the divorce court-particularly if Rehn used marital funds 
to make the purchase. R. 715. In light of Rehn's goals, Christensen advised Rehn to buy the 
property post-divorce. R. 715. 
Undoubtedly, there was a connection between the property and both Rehn's divorce 
and subsequent appeal. Rehn consulted Christensen regarding the property in the context of 
the divorce. As th~ parties argued and negotiated as to custody, alimony, child support, 
division of property and debts, the goal of living in the marital home affected Rehn's 
negotiations and decisions. Rehn's presence in the home was a basis to show stability and a 
basis for joint custodial rights. See R. 3944:216. Rehn obtained an award of joint custody. 
R. 3944:278. His increased custody was directly connected to how to calculate the amount of 
child support which was a subject of the appeal. See general!J RBhn v. RBhn, 1999 UT App 041, 
974 P.2d 306. 
Rehn has pointed out that the divorce decree does not mention the property and that 
he did not own the property at the time of the divorce.13 He is thus focusing only on 
whether the property was the subject of the representation. Likewise, the district court also 
focused on whether the property was the subject of the representation, giving Christensen 
credit only for the time he might have directly discussed the property with Rehn. Focusing 
on whether the property was the subject of the divorce case and ceasing inquiry at that 
juncture fails to consider the alternative basis for a lien provided by U.C.A. § 38-2-7. 
As this Court acknowledged in Sumsion, there need only be a connection between the 
property and the representation. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, ,r 15. And, in fact, this Court 
13 Ironically, one of the goals of the representation was to keep the property out of the 
divorce decree. 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has acknowledged that there might be a plausible connection between land and a 
representation regarding an incident that occurred on the land. Id. In this case, the property 
was the marital home-the location of multiple familial interactions or incidents that were 
the subject of litigation or carried out by court order. The evidence related to the location of 
the home and its distance from the other parent is a specific factor in joint custody 
determinations. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(e). Also, maintaining a status quo for 
associations of children in the neighborhood, stability in continuing with the same school 
and whether the home is large enough for the children and whether it is well kept are factors 
for a court to consider in determining child custody. Further, the home in this case also 
affected alimony because Rehn' s expenses related the home impacted his ability to pay 
alimony. See Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(8). The issue of alimony was raised in the appeal, so it 
was connected to the home. See 'Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ,I 6 et seq. The property's 
status as the marital home alone puts it on par with the property considered in Sumsion. 
But, this case goes beyond that mark because Rehn consulted Christensen about 
becoming the property owner and about keeping the property out of the divorce. Rehn's 
prospective future ownership of the property (and factors affecting his ability to purchase in 
the future) was a consideration in the actual representation. 
2. Regardless of irregularities, the Ii.en was still enforceable. 
Rehn makes much of the fact that Appellees' notice of lien was not an amended 
notice, though the title described it as such. Rehn also complains about the statute citation in 
the lien, the precise amount owed (which would change regularly even after recording of the 
notice), and other language in the Notice. These errors do not cancel the fact that Rehn 
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incurred attorney fees and, after the divorce decree entered, did not pay them off. Under 
those facts, Appellees had a valid attorney's lien on properties connected to the divorce, 
including Rehn's property. The purpose of the notice of lien was simply to put the world on 
notice as to the existence of a lien. None of the purported deficits raise questions about the 
lien's existence. They may raise a question about the actual amount or as to the history of the 
lien, but the recorded lien unambiguously states that a lien exists. Therefore it provides the 
requisite notice. Those facts alone bring the lien into existence under operation of the 
statutes. None of the claimed procedural irregularities invalidate the lien. 
B. Appellees held a consensual lien against Rehn. 
To support its ruling that Appellees had made a false statement with regard to the 
second element of title, the district court concluded that Appellees held no consensual lien, 
relying on a construction of Appellees' pleadings that did not favor Appellees. R. 1957. Tius 
conclusion was erroneous. Further, Appellees had directly asserted the existence of a 
consensual lien in their answer. R. 338. 
"All pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice." U.R.C.P. 8(£). "In 
determining the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint ... one must not have recourse 
to only certain parts of the complaint, but must determine the effect that should be given to 
the complaint when considered as a whole." Geros v. Harries, 236 P. 220,222 (Utah 1925). 
In paragraph 114 of his complaint, Rehn alleged: "The Lien was also not authorized 
by agreement because there is no signed agreement between SSC and Rehn." R. 18. 
Appellees answered as follows: ''Defendants admit that there is no signed agreement 
authorizing the filing of the lien but deny any other allegations of fact in this paragraph." 
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R. 324. This was a true statement. SSC was an entity. Steve Christensen had a lien by 
assignment from HNC, but SSC did not have a signed agreement with Rehn. The answer 
denies all but the stated assertion. The stated assertion was true as to SSC only, yet the court 
gave it the expanded interpretation of meaning that there was no agreement between Rehn 
or HNC or SSC or Steve Christensen individually. That reading of the admission goes far 
beyond the language of the complaint and erroneously imputes an admission that 
Christensen did not make. 
Further, in that same document, as part of a counterclaim, Appellees alleged as 
follows: "As a term of the retainer agreement, Rehn gave SSC a consensual lien." R. 328. 
Appellees then quoted the following part of the agreement between HN C and Rehn: 
R.338. 
Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen shall be entitled to a lien for services 
rendered including a lien on your residence, other real property or any 
subsequent settlement or judgment, as permitted the laws of the State of Utah 
or any other state where services are provided, in the event the bill has not 
been paid in full with thirty (30) days of billing. 
In this case, the district court construed Appellees' answer to paragraph 114 of the 
complaint as a judicial admission that there was no consensual lien. R. 1957. But, an 
admission in an answer only extends to the language asserted in the complaint. Considering 
the responsive pleading and counterclaim as a whole, it is clear that same pleading directly 
alleges the existence of a consensual lien. Moreover, Appellees have not admitted a lack of 
written agreement with HNC as to creation of a lien. 
As to the wording of the agreement itself-it does not limit itself to a statutory 
attorney's lien. It merely says HNC will have a lien as permitted by law. This means any lien 
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that is not illegal. The district court gave the agreement a meaning that is not supported by 
its plain language. That is, the district court interpreted the contract to mean "HNC will have 
a lien as created by law." Considering that Appellees not only alleged the existence of a 
consensual lien, but produced a supporting signed, written document, the district court 
should not have construed Appellees' pleadings as an admission that there was no 
consensual lien. Further, the court should not have limited the available liens under the 
HNC contract. If, in fact, there was a valid lien, there could not be slander of title. Further, 
even if Christensen had reason to believe there was a valid lien, there could not be slander of 
title under the facts of this case. 
C. Even if there were scrivener's errors in the notice of lien, they were not 
sufficient to support a judgment against Appellees for slander of title because 
the lien, whether an attorney lien or a consensual lien, was still enforceable. 
To prevail on a claim for slander of title, the first two elements a plaintiff must 
establish are that "(1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging 
claimant's title" and "(2) the statement was false." Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Co,p. Retirement Trust, 
2014 UT 14, ,r 36,326 P.3d 656. A disparaging statement is an "unfounded claim of an 
interest in the property which throws doubt upon its ownership." Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 
510, 513 (Utah 1951). Thus, the false statement a plaintiff uses to establish slander of title 
must be the statement that claims interest in and throws doubt on ownership of the 
property. 
In this case, as discussed supra, Appellees held an attorney lien because there was a 
connection between Rehn's property and the uncompensated work Christensen performed 
for Rehn. Appellees also held a consensual lien. Also discussed supra, the liens existed and 
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were enforceable regardless of procedural irregularities in the notice of lien or in notifying 
Rehn about the lien. Thus, Appellees' erroneous statements in the lien are irrelevant to 
slander of title because they do not affect whether the lien(s) in question exist or are 
enforceable. The key is that Appellees held a lien and claimed to hold a lien. Whether the 
proper notices were sent and received is another matter not affecting the validity of the 
lien.14 In sum, the statements Appellees made regarding the existence of a lien were not false. 
Therefore, the district court's judgment against Appellees for slander of title should be 
reversed. 
D. The district court's erroneous summary judgment ruling constitutes harmful 
error and should be reversed 
Harmful errors are grounds to disturb the erroneous court order. U.R.C.P. 61. An 
error is harmful if "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. LArsen, 2005 UT App 201, ,I 4, 113 P.3d 998. 
In this case, the district court's erroneous ruling that Christensen made publication of 
a slanderous, false statement resulted in the jury being directed of this negative, but untrue 
fact. Therefore, the jury received the message that a court had determined as a matter of law 
that Christensen had taken unauthorized action against Rehn. Rehn thereafter obtained a 
money judgment against Appellees. Because there was no slander of title, the court should 
14 Generally, failure to give proper notice gives rise to certain penalties, but does not 
invalidate the lien itself. See Utah Code Ann.§ 38-12-103. Arguably, there may be no penalty 
associated with attorney liens. See U.C.A. §§ 38-12-103, 38-12-102(3)(k), & 38-2-7 (imposing 
penalties for failing to follow general notice requirements, exempting liens with same or 
stricter notice requirements from general notice requirements, and not imposing penalties 
for failure to follow notice requirements, respectively). 
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have dismissed the slander of title claim on summary judgment. Therefore, the district 
court's erroneous ruling constitutes harmful error and this Court should reverse. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLEES DID NOT ACTUALLY KNOW THEIR 
CLAIM TO A LIEN WAS FALSE. 
Rehn argued that the scrivener's errors in the Notice were part of a nefarious 
conspiracy against Rehn. However Christensen's testimony that he made honest mistakes in 
the form of the lien notice was unrebutted. 15 There was no evidence of malicious intent. 
Additionally, there was no evidence that Christensen actually knew he had no lien 
rights against Rehn's property. Thus, the district court should have granted Appellees' 
motion for a directed verdict on the question of malice. Because the district court's failure to 
grant the motion for a directed verdict constituted harmful error, this Court should reverse 
the district court and dismiss Rehn's slander of title claim. 
A. A slander of title plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that the statements at issue were false. 
A plaintiff asserting a slander of title claim must demonstrate not only publication of 
a slanderous, false statement, but also that "the statement was made with malice." Dillon v. S. 
Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ~ 36,326 P.3d 656 (emphasis removed). There are 
two paths to establishing malice. The first is a showing of actual malice-an "intent to 
injure, vex or annoy," or intent founded on "hatred, spite or ill will." Id. (quoting another 
source). The second path is a showing of implied malice, which is inferred from the 
defendant "knowingly and wrongfully" publishing "something untrue or spurious" where 
15 Christensen's testimony regarding his creating the notice of lien using a template is found 
at R 3944:240-43. 
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the defendant "should reasonably foresee" a possibility of "damage to the owner of the 
property." Id. ( quoting another source). 
Regardless of whether the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate actual or implied malice, 
he or she must demonstrate that "the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements at 
issue were false." Id. ,I 35. As discussed in this brief, supra, liens come into existence and are 
enforceable regardless of irregularities regarding the giving of notice. See Parts I.A.2 & I. C of 
Argument. 
In Dillon, the defendant, a company that owned thousands of properties, hired a third 
party to originate property loans. Dillon ,I 1. Through interactions with the loan originator, 
the plaintiffs predecessor in interest paid off the defendant's interest in a property so that 
plaintiff's predecessor could sell the property to plaintiff. Id. ,I 8. In a separate lawsuit against 
the third party loan originator, the Dilhn defendant sued for that money, asserting that it 
"knew of and accepted the consequences of the discharge of the loan." Id. ,I 39. 
Undisputedly, in a situation where the Dillon defendant was simultaneously suing the loan 
originator for the loss of the interest against the plaintiffs' property, the Dillon defendant 
knew that plaintiffs had no obligation and thus was acting with malice in its attempts to 
enforce its prior interest against plaintiff. Id. ,I 38. 
In Banberry Crossing, a trust deed trustee recorded a notice of default that described an 
entire tract of property. First Security Bank of Utah, NA. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 
1256 (Utah 1989). There were portions of the tract for which the trustee should not have 
recorded a notice of default. Id. Despite the notice of default falsely covering properties for 
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which there was no colorable claim, the Utah Supreme Court declined to conclude that there 
had been malicious behavior sufficient to justify a judgment for slander of title. Id. at 1257. 
B. Appellees hereby marshal the evidence that, taken in the light most favorable 
to Rehn, supports a conclusion that Appellees actually knew they held no lien 
rights against Rehn. 
Christensen admitted that, as of the time of trial, 16 he had "many years [sic] 
experience drafting and recording liens." R. 3944:150-51. Christensen also admitted that at 
the time he drafted the lien, he was, in a more general sense, experienced. R. 3944:183. 
Christensen admitted that he was intimately familiar with the findings of fact in 
Rehn' s divorce case and that he was aware that the divorce court did not divide real property 
in Rehn's divorce. R. 3944:154, 157, 192. 
Christensen was unable to identify or bring forward any invoice sent to Rehn for 
services rendered in which Christensen had specifically noted that he was billing Rehn for a 
conversation and legal advice regarding Rehn's property. R. 3944:159-60. 
Despite Christensen testifying that he had discussed potential future ownership of the 
property with Rehn, Christensen had no documentation of the conversation and could not 
recall when the conversation took place. R. 3944:162-63. Specifically, Christensen could not 
recall the time of year, month, day, or time of day during which the conversation occurred. 
Id. Christensen could also not recall whether the conversation was by telephone or in-
person. Id. 
Christensen admitted that there was only one conversation between he and Rehn 
regarding the property. R. 3944:164. 
16 The questions directed to Christensen focused on his current status. 
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Rehn testified that the conversation regarding the property never took place and that 
he could not have afforded to purchase the house at that time, anyway. R. 3944:275, 277. 
Christensen admitted that approximately $800 of Rehn's nearly $27,000 bill was for 
non-divorce work. R. 3944: 194. 
Rehn established that in the same year Appellees recorded the lien against Rehn's 
property a new attorney lien statute had gone into effect and that the statute citation in the 
notice of lien incorrectly cited to the old statute. R. 3944:194--95. 
Rehn accused Christensen of putting the word "amended" into the notice of lien in 
an attempt to invoke the previous statute, but Christensen denied this accusation. 
R. 3944:196. 
The evidence showed that the assignment of Rehn's account to Christensen's control 
or ownership was not documented on paper until after the dispute with Rehn arose. 
R. 3944:198. 
C. Rehn failed to demonstrate that Appellees actually: knew they held no lien 
against him and thus failed to establish malice. 
To establish malice, Rehn needed to show that Christensen actually knew that his 
claim that Appellees held a lien against Rehn's property was false. See Dillon, 135. In Dillon, 
the plaintiffs established malice by showing that the defendant had positively asserted in 
another case that it had lost its interest and that the loan originator should be liable for the 
loss. Dillon can be distinguished from the present case because Appellees did not 
affirmatively assert that they had lost the lien to Rehn' s property and believed the lien valid 
until the district court's summary judgment. Rehn has failed to produce evidence showing 
that at some point prior to the district court's summary judgment ruling, Christensen or any 
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Appellee were aware that they lacked a valid lien on Rehn' s residence. In fact, the evidence 
tends to suggest that Christensen always believed he had a lien, even if he should have 
known that there were errors in the form of his notice of lien. See R. 3944:258.17 
The closest Rehn came to establishing actual knowledge on the part of the Appellees 
was Christensen's admission that as of recording of the lien, Christensen was an experienced 
attorney18 who was aware that the property was not the subject of the divorce decree. 
However, those admissions do not establish that Appellees had actual knowledge that there 
was no valid lien, particularly where being mentioned in a divorce decree is not necessarily 
the threshold detennination for whether a piece of property is subject to an attorney's lien. 
As discussed, supra, the property was the subject of a consultation and was otherwise 
connected to the divorce, even if Rehn' s assertion that no such consultation occurred is true. 
In Banberry Crossing, there was no malice where the trustee could have presumably 
done some research and positively concluded that there was no default possible for certain 
parcels in the tract because of certain conveyances. In this case, had Appellees done some 
research, the answer as to whether they had a lien would have been inconclusive because 
there appears to be no bright-line rule as to what degree of connection is sufficient between 
a representation and a property for a valid attorney's lien. If Dillon and Banberry Crossing are 
17 Moreover, on appeal, Appellees assert that there was a lien, whether statutory or 
consensual. 
18 At trial, Rehn emphasized that a new attorney lien statute went into effect during the same 
year Christensen recorded the lien and attempted to suggest that Christensen titled the lien 
as being amended in an attempt to bring the lien under the older statute. First, it is unclear 
how calling the lien amended changes the controlling statute if there is no orig-inal lien. 
Second, if anything, the new statute situation should imply that Christensen had become less 
experienced with attorney liens and thus less aware that his lien against Rehn might fail. 
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placed on a spectrum with Dillon on the left (malice established) and Banberry Crossing on the 
right (malice not established), this case falls to the right of Banberry Crossing. 
Putting this case far to the right of Banberry Crossing is appropriate because Appellees 
never affirmatively asserted in a separate court proceeding that they had lost their interest in 
Rehn's property. In fact, the Rehn situation was quite the opposite. Appellees did not 
interfere with Rehn's bankruptcy, relying on the validity of the lien against Rehn's property. 
R. 3944:254-55. Rehn never challenged the lien although he was represented by counsel in 
his bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee never challenged the validity of the lien. The lien was 
a matter of public record and the title to the property was held in Rehn's name at the time of 
his personal bankruptcy in 2004. Rehn not only had public notice of the lien, but he and 
Christensen had discussed the lien and the refinance of his property to pay the outstanding 
attorney fees. Christensen had sent more than one notice of the lien to Rehn of the lien. 
As to the questions raised about the timing of the transfer of interest between 
Christensen's firms, those do not show that Christensen actually knew that he or any of the 
Appellees lacked a valid lien. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that there was no 
informal transfer of interest. To the contrary, Christensen asserted that on the dissolution of 
Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen, he was assigned the right to the Rehn account. This 
assertion was unrebutted at trial. Further, the facts of the case support the conclusion that 
Christensen was assigned this case. First, he continued to be the only attorney billing on the 
case after HNC dissolved. Second, the only other living partner, Clark Nielsen, later signed 
an assignment ratifying this assignment. 
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The court held that one conversation is not sufficient to make the property the 
subject of the representation. However, the law does not support this conclusion. 
Christensen was consulted about the property and he gave advice to Rehn concerning it. 
There is no requirement in the law that the property has to be a substantial part of the 
representation in order to be the subject of such for lien rights. 
Moreover, even if the court found that one conversation about how title to the 
property should be held was not sufficient to make the property the subject of the 
representation, Christensen's representation was otherwise connected to the divorce. The 
home had been the central residence of this family for several years before and for 
approximately 15 years after the divorce. Important findings in the divorce related to 
custody and finances were connected with the real property in question. On issues of 
custody, the stability of Rehn and the children, the connection to the neighborhood and 
schools and the ability of Rehn to provide a suitable home for the children was 
interconnected with this real property. On financial issues of the divorce, Rehn's ability to 
pay alimony because of his expenses for housing and utilities particularly were connected to 
this real property. Because the home location, contents, design, and costs were connected to 
the divorce and at least to the appeal of alimony and child support, Christensen had a good 
faith belief that the representation was connected to the real property in question. 
Finally, and most obviously, there was also a written agreement between Rehn and 
one of the Appellees explicitly creating a consensual lien. Rehn signed this agreement 
Christensen relied on the agreement to give him a lien in his property. The insertion of the 
lien on Rehn's residence in the agreement between the parties further shows that Rehn 
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contemplated buying the real property in question. Also, the fact that Rehn did buy the 
property further verifies that Christensen and Rehn discussed whether he should do so. 
Long after Rehn signed the HNC retainer agreement, Christensen memorialized a discussion 
between them about putting a lien on the property in order to pay Christensen's fee. This 
was never opposed by Rehn and supports a conclusion that a consensual lien was originally 
intended between the parties. In fact, Rehn started paying $125 a month and Christensen 
waived interest for six months in acknowledgement of the parties' later agreement for 
Christensen to affix the lien even though Rehn never signed the later agreement. Because 
there is a written agreement to allow the specific lien that Christensen gave notice of, it 
cannot be shown that he had knowledge that he was not entitled to assert a lien against 
Rehn's property. 
Because Christensen testified that he believed the lien to be valid and that testimony 
was u.nrebutted, Rehn did not establish that Christensen had actual knowledge that he had 
no right to a lien. Rehn failed to establish the elements of malice. Therefore, the slander of 
title claim should be reversed. 
D. The district court's refusal to grant a directed verdict on the issue of malice 
constitutes harmful error and should be reversed 
Harmful errors are grounds to disturb the erroneous court order. U.R.C.P. 61. An 
error is harmful if "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, ,r 4, 113 P.3d 998. 
In this case, had the district court granted the directed verdict motion on malice, 
Rehn's slander of title claim would have failed, and no judgment would have entered against 
Appellees. 
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III. THE ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED WERE NOT REASONABLY 
NECESSARY TO REMOVE APPELLEES' LIEN. 
"In slander of title cases, attorney fees may be recovered as special damages if the 
fees are reasonabfy necessary to remedy the disparagement of the plaintiffs title." Neff v. Ne.ff, 
2011 UT 6, 179, 247 P.3d 380 (emphasis added). Determining what attorney fees are 
allowable as "reasonably necessary" is difficult because Utah case law addressing the outer 
limits of that precise phrase is either scarce or not sufficiently explicit. 
A. For attorney fees to be "reasonably necessary" to remedy a disparagement of 
title, they should be reasonable in amount and be incurred to pursue a 
reasonable method of remedying the disparagement. 
Having found little case law expounding on what kinds of attorney fees are 
reasonably necessary and what kinds are not reasonably necessary for purposes of special 
damages in slander of title, Appellees propose that this Court construe "reasonably 
necessary" as requiring that the attorney fees be both reasonable in amount and incurred to 
pursue a reasonable method of remedying the disparagement of title. 
An example of a reasonably necessary amount of attorney fees would be the amount 
of attorney fees billed for a simple quiet title action where the attorney billed a commonly 
acceptable rate and avoided inefficient tasks. But, the amount of attorney fees would not be 
reasonably necessary if the attorney billed twenty times the average rate or was grossly 
inefficient 
As to reasonable methods to remedy disparagement, a method may be reasonably 
necessary if the method can achieve the desired remedy on its own, if the cost/benefit ratio 
associated with the method is appropriate, and if the method itself is acceptable in light of 
the specific case and public policy. 
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For example, where there is an unlawful property lien, a quiet title action is a 
reasonably necessary method because the quiet title action, on its own, can force removal of 
the lien. Moreover, there is no public policy against quiet title, though the cost/benefit ratio 
may render the quiet title action superfluous where the plaintiff has other options that are 
cheaper.19 
Other methods that cannot on their own force removal of a lien, that are otherwise 
economically inefficient, or that are inappropriate should not qualify as being reasonably 
necessary. Even if those methods do result in the lienholder voluntarily removing of the lien, 
why should a slander of title defendant have to pay damages for those methods when a more 
efficient and appropriate method to determine the parties' rights was available? 
For example, if a plaintiff sues a lienholder for personal injury and demands release of 
the lien as a condition for dismissal of the personal injury action, the personal injury lawsuit 
is not a reasonably necessary method because it cannot result in the lienholder being forced 
to remove the lien and might involve substantial costs that might have been avoided by 
using a quiet title action. 
Another example: if the plaintiff requires the testimony of an expert to win the quiet 
title case, it would not be reasonably necessary for that plaintiff to hire an additional thirty-
nine experts to review and confirm the original expert's findings because the additional 
experts provide little benefit for an astronomical cost. 
19 For instance, in some cases, it may be far cheaper to pay off the lien and then sue under 
slander of title to recover that money used to clear the lien. See, e.g., Huff v. Jennings, 459 
S.E.2d 886, 892 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
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As to methods that would be against public policy, one such might involve criminal 
or tortious acts of coercion. Such acts might scare the lienholder into releasing the lien and 
might be cheaper than litigation (in the short run), but no court will award a slander of title 
plaintiff the costs of performing criminal or tortious actions because such approaches are 
patently unreasonable and unacceptable. 
B. The attorney fees "reasonably necessary" to remedy a disparagement of title 
must be separated from the attorney fees that were not reasonably necessary 
to remedy the disparagement of title. 
The burden is on ·Rehn to demonstrate that expenses were reasonably necessary to 
remedy a disparagement of title. 20 When the legal action that actually clears title is molded in 
with other actions, some of which could have cleared title, some of which could not have 
cleared title, and some of which are focused on collecting the attorney fees incurred to clear 
title, Rehn must show with specificity what fees were incurred to remedy his claimed 
disparagement of title. Utah case law establishes that attorney fees incurred to pursue the 
slander of title action are per se ineligible to be awarded as damages in the slander of title 
action. Thus, the requesting party must separate attorney fees for slander of title actions 
from the fees reasonably necessary to remedy disparagement of title, even if incurred in the 
same lawsuit. 
20 See D£/lon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36, 326 P.3d 656. 
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1. Slander of ti.tie attorney fees are per se not eligible as slander of ti.tie damages. 
In Utah, attorney fees incurred to pursue a slander of title judgment are per se not 
reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. 21 This result necessarily follows 
from the American Rule: 
The general rule for attorney fees in tort cases is that the parties are each 
responsible for their own fees. Under this rule, commonly referred to as the 
"American Rule," the prevailing party may generally only recover fees if a 
statutory or contractual provision entitles that party to such an award. An 
important corollary to this rule is that the fees employed to prove that one has 
suffered as the result of a tort may not be counted as a component of the 
damages. Were it otherwise, all attorney fees would be characterized as 
damages, and the general rules would cease to have any effect. 
Nejf,I 77 (addressing slander of title damages); accord Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 413 
(M:e. 1996) ( explicitly holding that attorney fees to pursue slander of title are not reasonably 
necessary to remedy a disparagement of title and that awarding them would violate the 
American Rule). 
2. Even if incurred in the same lawsuit that clears ti.tie, attorney fees that were not 
reasonab!J necessary to remedy the disparagement of ti.tie should not be awarded as 
slander of title damages. 
As noted above, in Utah, the attorney fees incurred for pursuing slander of title 
cannot be included in a damage awards with the attorney fees reasonably necessary to 
remedy disparagement of title. This suggests that Utah requires some sort of allocation 
between separate causes of action. The language in Neff supports this proposition: "To the 
extent that ... legal action is reasonably necessary to remove clouds from the party's title, the 
21 Part of the support for this proposition is bare logic. A slander of title action, standing on 
its own, does not remove an invalid lien. Thus, the expenses incurred to pursue the slander 
of title cannot possibly be reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. In fact, 
before there can be a meaningful slander of title claim, there must already be damages. 
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party may recover those attorney fees." Neff ,r 80 (emphasis added). By usmg the phrase "to 
the extent," the Utah Supreme Court, in Neff, seems to be suggesting that a slander of title 
plaintiff cannot collect for the entire lawsuit that results in remedy of the disparagement. Neff 
seems to require that only the attorney fees for the portions of the lawsuit that are necessary 
to remove the disparagement should be eligible as being awarded as damages for slander of 
title. In this case, the disparagement was removed on February 7, 2013, and the property was 
sold soon after without a cloud on the title. 
The Utah Supreme Court was also looking for specificity in damages m another case: 
"Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the saleability or use of the 
property, there is no damage." Bass v. Planned Management Serus., Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
1988) ( emphasis added) ( concluding that since "plaintiffs' attorney fees were not incurred to 
clear title or to undo any harm created by whatever slander of title occurred, there were no 
special damages, and the award of attorney fees was gratuitous"). The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine has explicitly spelled this theory out, saying, "It is the costs of prosecution of 
the counts which cleared the fplaintiffj's title, i.e. the quiet title counts and the declaratory 
judgment count which are appropriately characterized as 'special damages' and for which 
[Defendant] should bear liability." Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405,413 (Me. 1996). 
C. The district court should have granted Appellees' request for JNOV or a new 
trial on attorney fees because the jui:y awarded Rehn damages for attornev fees 
that were not reasonably necessary to remedy the disparagement of title 
caused by Appellees' lien. 
Appellees preface their argument by marshallUlg the evidence supporting the jury's 
decision and then proceed to argue why the jury's decision is insupportable. 
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1. Appellees hereby substantialfy marshal the evidence that, taken in the light most 
favorable to Rehn, support an assertion that the amount of damages the Jury 
awarded were reasonab!J necessary to remedy the disparagement of title. 
Rehn testified at trial that because Appellees would not release the lien, he was 
compelled to go through an extensive and costly legal process. R. 3944:272. Rehn testified 
that he incurred $77,752.29 in attorney fees, that the $77,752.29 was for removal of the lien, 
that the amount was reasonable, and that he could not have removed the lien for a lesser 
amount. R. 3944:299-300. 
One of Rehn's attorneys testified that the billing and amounts were all reasonable and 
part of an overall strategy with multiple pieces moving toward the same goal. R. 3945:82-88. 
That attorney also testified that a $7,847.5022 motion to strike Christensen's declaration, 
denied by the district court, was reasonable partially because it brought contradictions in 
Appellees' prior statements to the district court's attention. R. 3945:101-02. 
2. Ma'!J portions of Rehn 1 attorney fies were per se not reasonab!J necessary to remedy 
the lien disparaging the title to Rehn 1 properry. For others, there is a lack of 
evidence supportz'ng their necessiry. 
As noted prior, the $77,752.29 awarded to Rehn included most of the attorney fees 
he incurred from the time he engaged his attorneys' services up to the summary judgment 
ruling.23 See R. 3868. A substantial portion of these fees were not reasonably necessary to 
remedy the disparagement ofRehn's title to his property. Thus, they should not have been 
awarded to Rehn in a slander of title judgment. 
22 See R. 3945:53. 
23 In the summary judgment ruling, the district court invalidated Appellees' lien and granted 
Rehn partial judgment on his slander of title claim, among other things. R. 1955-59. 
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Some of the $77,752.29 was incurred to pursue Rehn's slander of title claim. The 
slander of title claim was part of the original complaint that Rehn's attorneys drafted. No 
doubt Rehn's attorneys researched slander of title before and after drafting the complaint. 
They prepared for and successfully obtained a favorable summary judgment ruling. Under 
Utah law, the fees incurred for pursuing a slander of title judgment are per se prohibited 
from being included as damages in the slander of title judgment. No amount of evidence 
that Rehn presented in meeting his burden to prove damages can support a determination 
that it was reasonably necessary for Rehn to incur the slander of title attorney fees to remedy 
a disparagement of title. As a matter of law, the jury should not have been permitted to 
award Rehn the attorney fees he incurred for slander of title before the summary judgment 
ruling.24 Instead of denying Appellees' post-trial motion, the district court should have 
ordered a new trial on the issue or otherwise modified the judgment. 
Rehn incurred another substantial portion of the $77,752.29 to pursue matters not 
reasonably necessary to remedy the disparagement caused by Appellees' lien. These matters 
involved claims for ''bankruptcy, bar complaints, Utah's wrongful lien statute, civil 
conspiracy, intentional interference with economic relations, promissory estoppel, 
permanent injunctions after the lien had already been voided, [and] equitable estoppel .... " 
R. 3659. Looking at Rehn's nearly decade-old bankruptcy case, considering bar complaints 
against Christensen, and attempting to pursue the other listed causes of action25 are not 
24 The jury was not permitted to award Rehn the attorney fees he incurred after the summary 
judgment in which Appellees' lien was invalidated. R. 3868. 
25 Even if wrongful lien cause of action was appropriate, the district court dismissed it 
because of the statute of limitations. R 1955-59. Therefore, it could not have remedied the 
disparagement. The request for permanent injunction was also unnecessary because once the 
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reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. Moreover, slander of title plaintiffs 
should be required to mitigate their damages somewhat by choosing reasonable and direct 
methods to remedy the disparagement of their title. As the Utah Supreme Court phrased it 
in Bass, those efforts were gratuitous. 
Rehn also did not allocate $32,594.93 of the $77,752.29 and specify for what that 
money was spent. Admittedly, there was testimony that all of the fees were reasonably 
necessary and related to removing the lien, but as demonstrated in the preceding two 
paragraphs, that cannot possibly be true. Portions of the $32,594.93 would have been spent 
on matters discussed in the previous paragraph, like slander of title, that are, per se, ineligible 
to be awarded as attorney fees. Because Rehn did not tie those fees directly to a method that 
was reasonably necessary ( or even successful) in remedying the disparagement of his title, the 
jury should not have been allowed to consider those fees in making its award to Rehn. The 
district court should have directed a verdict, granted Appellees' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, or ordered a new trial on the attorney fees issue. 
Additionally, some of the attorney fees Rehn incurred, even if they are related to 
removing Appellees' lien, are plainly unreasonable. Admittedly, the controlling standard of 
review makes it difficult for Appellees to challenge the reasonableness of an attorney fee 
amount if the attorney fee was incurred for a purpose that, as a matter of law, is conceivably 
reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. This is because there was testimony 
at trial that the amounts were reasonable and thus there exists a basis in evidence to support 
the jury's determination. However, the assertion that it was reasonably necessary for Rehn to 
lien is gone, it is gone. Slander of title allows damages to remove a disparagement of title-
not prevent future disparagements of title. 
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incur $7,847.50 on a failed motion to strike Christensen's declaration is simply unsustainable. 
One of Rehn's attorneys testified that the motion to strike was simply a pawn in the overall 
strategy and that mostly, it brought alleged contradictions to the district court's attention. 
Per se, it is not reasonably necessary to spend nearly $8,000 on an unsuccessful motion to 
strike for the purpose of bringing a contradiction to the court's attention when a short 
paragraph in one of the summary judgment memorandums would have sufficed. Even if 
Rehn's attorney testified it was reasonably necessary for Rehn to incur this expense, such 
testimony, in that specific context, should not qualify as a "basis in evidence" to support the 
jury's verdict. 
Many of the attorney fees Rehn incurred and for which the jury awarded him 
damages were ineligible, as a matter of law, to remedy a disparagement of title. Even if Rehn 
convinced the jury that his expenses were reasonable, Utah case law does not allow as 
damages expenses not reasonably necessary to remedy a disparagement of title. The district 
court should have granted Appellees' motion for JNOV or a new trial. 
D. The district court's refusal to grant Appellees' JNOV or new trial motion is 
harmful error and should be reversed. 
Harmful errors are grounds to disturb the erroneous court order. U.R.C.P. 61. An 
error is harmful if "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, ,r 4, 113 P.3d 998. 
In this case, the district court's erroneous ruling allowed a judgment for an inappropriate 
amount of money to stand against Appellees. Therefore, the district court's erroneous ruling 
constitutes harmful error, and this Court should reverse it and remand for appropriate 
findings as to what Rehn's damages should be. 
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RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S ISSUES 
IV. UTAH CODE§ 78B-5-826 DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE SLANDER OF 
TITLE CLAIM BECAUSE NO PARTY ASSERTED A CONTRACT'S 
ENFORCEABILITY AS A BASIS FOR RECOVERY THEREUNDER. 
V4i As per the reciprocal attorney fee statute, a Utah "court may award costs and attorney 
fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any ... written contract" only 
"when the provisions of the ... written contract ... allow at least one party to recover 
attorney fees." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "an 
action is 'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation assert[ s] the 
writing's enforceability as basis for recovery."' Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ,I 22,285 
P.3d 766 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Bilanzjch v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ,I 15, 
160 P.3d 1041). 
Under the reciprocal fee statute, the civil action is based upon a contract if a party 
asserts the contract's enforceability as a basis for recovery. It was unnecessary for Rehn to 
prove enforceability of a contract to prevail on slander of title because he needed only 
establish damages from malicious publication of a false statement regarding title. Indeed, 
Rehn did not attempt to prove the contract's enforceability as part of his case-in-chief. 
Instead, he relied on Appellees' alleged judicial admission that there was no contract. See 
R. 1955-59. 
As is commonly done with contractual attorney fee awards, a court awarding attorney 
fees under the reciprocal statute should differentiate between fees related to contractual 
claims and fees related to other claims "for which there is no entitlement for attorney fees." 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). See also Reighard v. Yates, 2012 
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UT 45, ,r 41,285 P.3d 1168 (awarding defendant contractual attorney fees for successfully 
defending contractual cause of action, but not awarding plaintiff any attorney fees despite 
plaintiff prevailing on tort cause of action in the same case); McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes 
Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App 53, if123-25, 298 P.3d 666 (focusing on the nature of an 
individual cause of action within the lawsuit when determining whether a party qualified for 
an award of attorney fees under the reciprocal statute). To hold otherwise would encourage 
prospective plaintiffs to assert one cause of action based on a contract containing an 
attorney fee provision and then take a free ride for as many causes of action as could be 
vaguely related to the contractual claim and joined to the case. Cj Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 
56 (Utah 1998) (espousing a desire to avoid free rides against all defendants based on a 
substantial claim against one defendant). Additionally the word "action" in the statute should 
be related to "cause of action" instead of to entire lawsuits where multiple causes of action 
and parties may be joined. 
Rehn is requesting attorney fees he incurred after the Court entered its summary 
judgment order disposing of Appellees' contractual counterclaim and granting Rehn's 
declaratory relief/ quiet title claim. R. 3323-3407. But, all litigation occurring after entry of 
that order was limited to the slander of title and estoppel claims, the latter of which Rehn 
withdrew26 following a favorable jury verdict. 
Appellees acknowledge that they asserted the existence of a contract in multiple 
instances and at multiple stages of the litigation. Indeed, Appellees sought to enforce the 
contract through their counterclaim, which was dismissed on summary judgment. R. 1955-
26 Because Rehn withdrew this claim, and technically did not prevail, it should not eligible for 
an award of attorney fees. 
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59, 3618. Later, Appellees asserted the contract's existence to prove a lack of the malice 
requisite for a slander of title claim. At that point, proving the contract's existence could 
serve no other purpose because there was no surviving counterclaim or hope of recovery for 
the Appellees under the contract. Indeed, the best possible outcome for Appellees was 
dismissal of Rehn's claims.27 Therefore, Appellees' post-summary judgment assertions 
regarding a contract were made as a basis for dismissal of Rehn's claims. The contractual 
assertions were not for any sort of recovery, which would have been required to invoke the 
reciprocal statute.28 Even if the jury had concluded that the contract existed and should have 
been enforced, the jurors could not award damages under the contract because the contract 
claims were already adjudicated. 
The reciprocal statute also requires that the provisions of the written contract allow at 
least one party to recover attorney fees. 29 The contract in question in this case allows the 
prevailing party to recover attorney fees only "[ijn the event legal action is taken to enforce 
27 On page 16 of his opening brief, Rehn asserts that if "Christensen had prevailed in that 
defense, Rehn would have been forced to reimburse Christensen's attorney fees .... " Rehn's 
statement demonstrates that Rehn is confusing counterclaims with mere defenses to claims 
and is not differentiating between claims where a contract is a basis for recovery and claims 
where a contract is irrelevant to the basis for recovery. If Appellees had prevailed on their 
contractual counterclaim, which was dismissed at summary judgment, Rehn would have 
owed attorney fees to Appellees because the enforceability of the contract would have been 
the basis for Appellees' recovery. But, if Appellees had successfully countered Rehn's slander 
of title claim with their "contract, thus no malice" defense, Rehn would have owed no 
attorney fees because no party had asserted enforceability of the contract as a basis far recovery 
before the jury. Conversely, Appellees should owe no attorney fees to Rehn, even though he 
prevailed on slander of title, because no party asserted enforceability of the contract as a basis 
far recovery. 
28 Appellees' contractual assertions did not change the fundamental nature of Rehn's tort 
cause of action, and they did not revive a previously dismissed counterclaim. 
29 It should be noted that, as per the statute, it is the provisions of the written contract that 
trigger the reciprocal award of attorney fees. Thus, Rehn's reasoning that Appellees could 
trigger the reciprocal award through their pleadings is faulty. 
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[the] agreement." R 338. No language in the agreement allowed for recovery of attorney fees 
in the event that a party pursued claims other than those related to enforcing the contract. 
Therefore, any attorney fees and costs associated with a cause of action not related to 
enforcing the agreement fall outside of the scope of its attorney fee recovery paragraph. 
Rehn is not entitled to a recovery under either the bare contract (which he argued did not 
exist under Appellees' alleged judicial admission) or the reciprocal statute. 
For these reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's denial of Rehn's 
request for attorney fees. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT IN NO WAY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DECLINED TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITABLE POWER TO 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES. 
"In general, Utah follows the traditional American rule that attorney fees cannot be 
recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Hughes 
v. Caffarry, 2004 UT 22, ,r 21, 89 P.3d 148. Admittedly, "a court has inherent equitable power 
to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest[ s] of justice 
and equity." Id. (quoting Stewart v. Utah Pub. Sero. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994)). A 
district court's decision regarcling such equitable awards is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Id. ,r 20. The Utah Supreme Court has used the phrases "considerable latitude" and 
"exceedingly broad" when referring to a district court's discretion in this type of matter. Id. 
Utah accords this discretion to the district court for good reason. The district court is "in the 
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as 
a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to gamer from a cold record." Id. ,r 24 
n.2 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
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Moreover, it should be noted that when "principles of equity confront rules of law, 
'equity follows the law."' Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649,651 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
another source). As discussed supra in Part III of this brief' s argument and as briefly noted 
above in this section, as per the American Rule, attorney fees incurred to pursue a slander of 
title action are per se not recoverable as damages. If a court decided to award those attorney 
fees anyway, it would be flying in the face of established case law and thus by definition, not 
acting in an equitable manner. 
In this case, Rehn argues that the district court, in an abuse of discretion, ignored 
Appellee Christensen's status as Rehn's former attorney when deciding whether to award 
equitable attorney fees for a slander of title trial. This simply is not true. In ruling on Rehn's 
motion,Judge Harris stated, "And I certainly appreciate the fact that the jury found that Jv.(r. 
Christensen had acted with malice and that Mr. Christensen did ... some things .... [I]he 
jury found that he acted ... with malice and that's kind of a big deal."30 R. 3942:56. 
Moreover, Rehn's memorandum supporting his motion was before the district court and 
apparently given due consideration. R. 3323-36. 
The district court was not ignoring any fact Rehn was using to argue in favor of an 
equitable award of attorney fees. Judge Harris' s decision was not an abuse of discretion. 
Having considered Rehn's arguments for attorney fees, having presided over the entirety of 
the proceedings, and having sat through trial and listened to witness testimony,Judge Harris 
weighed the equities and saw no reason to award Rehn his attorney fees. In addition to the 
30 Admittedly, the judge did not state that he explicitly understood that Christensen had been 
Rehn's attorney at a prior time, but he was fully aware of that fact, having sat through the 
trial and presided over all the litigation leading up to trial. 
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absence of a statute or a contract allowing attorney fees on Rehn's slander of title cause of 
action, there are a number of factors supporting Judge Harris's conclusion. 
For instance, the debt in the Appellees' lien notice was not imaginary. Christensen 
had previously represented Rehn on divorce and on appeal. Rehn had owed Christensen tens 
of thousands of dollars that he never paid. Further, Rehn had not moved for an award of 
attorney fees when the district court's order disposed of Appellees' contractual counterclaim. 
That would have been the appropriate time to raise any claims that the prevailing party is 
entitled to attorney fees. 
A review of the docket in this case (or record index) reveals little to support Rehn's 
assertion that Christensen, an attorney, was attempting to "exhaust his former client in 
litigation." Appellees filed an answer and simple counterclaim. They opposed Rehn's motion 
for summary judgment with their own motion for summary judgment. After losing on 
summary judgment, Appellees exercised their constitutional right to a jury trial after 
unsuccessfully attempting to dispose of the final claims on summary judgment. Rehn is the 
party pursuing this litigation past summary judgment. Christensen is only defending against 
Rehn's claims. Rehn has asserted that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
consider Christensen's malice toward a former client. As quoted above, the district court 
considered precisely that fact and others before making its decision. Although Rehn has 
attributed to Christensen the basest possible motives, there remains the fact that the district 
court did not adopt Rehn's assertions as findings of fact. The facts found to be undisputed 
on summary judgment were limited. See R. 1955-59. Likewise, the jury's findings of malice 
and damages were conclusionary. R. 3161-62. The official findings of fact on the record 
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show that a rational judge could weigh the equities and decline to award attorney fees. 
Therefore, the district court's decision to not award attorney fees should be affirmed. 
VI. REHN IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FOR HIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BELOW. 
Rehn argues that those entitled to attorney fees below are entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. But, as previously discussed, neither the reciprocal attorney fee statute nor the 
district court's ability to make an equitable award of attorney fees entitles Rehn to an award 
of attorney fees in this case. Therefore, Rehn is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court should have concluded that either an attorney's lien, a consensual 
lien, or both existed and dismissed Rehn's slander of title action. Additionally, there should 
have been no finding of malice because no evidence demonstrated that Christensen or any 
Appellee knew that there was no right to a lien against Rehn. Even if the this Court affirms 
the district court's decisions on the existence of a lien and malice, it should remand for a 
recalculation of damages because the jury awarded Rehn damages for attorney fees that were 
not reasonably necessary to remove Appellees' lien from his property. 
As to Rehn's claims on appeal, this Court should affirm the district court in denying 
Rehn attorney fees as prevailing party under the reciprocal attorney fee statute because 
Rehn's slander of title claim did not involve any assertions as to the enforceability of a 
contract as a basis for recovery. Moreover, Appellees' defense of a contract does not put the 
case under the reciprocal award statute because the assertion of existence of contract was to 
be a basis for dismissal, not recovery. 
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The district court further did not abuse its discretion in declining to make an 
equitable award of attorney fees because it considered the facts of this case fully. Moreover, 
equity follows the law or fills in the gaps between laws-it is not an exception to an 
otherwise prevailing law. An equitable award of fees in this case would run contrary to the 
American Rule, which has been held specifically to apply to slander of title cases and which 
requires that parties to litigation bear their own costs. Additionally, because Rehn is not 
entitled to attorney fees below, he is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellees request that this Court 
reverse the district court's slander of title judgment, affirm its denial of Rehn's attorney fees, 
and order that this case be dismissed with prejudice. Alternatively, if this Court concludes 
that dismissing the slander of title judgment is inappropriate, Appellees' request that this case 
be remanded to recalculate Rehn's damages. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of January, 2016. 
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ADDENDUM 
Appellees have inserted record page numbers on the bottom-right of pages extracted 
from the record and reproduced herein. The record numbers are based on the record index 
filed by the district court clerk on July 17, 2015. 
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§ 38-2-7. Compensation--Attorney's lien, UT ST§ 38-2-7 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 38. Liens 
Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Liens 
U.C.A.1953 § 38-2-7 
§ 38-2-7. Compensation-Attorney's lien 
Currentness 
(1) The compensation of an attorney is governed by agreement between the attorney and a client, express or 
implied, which is not restrained by law. 
(2) An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation due from a client on any money or property 
owned by the client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client, including: 
(a) any real, personal, or intangible property that is the subject of or connected with the work performed for 
the client; 
(b) any funds held by the attorney for the client, including any amounts paid as a retainer to the attorney by 
the client; and 
( c) any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor in any matter or action in which 
the attorney assisted, including any proceeds derived from the matter or action, whether or not the attorney is 
employed by the client at the time the settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment is obtained. 
(3) An attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the attorney by the client. 
(4)(a) An attorney may enforce a lien under this section by: 
(i) moving to intervene in a pending legal action: 
(A) in which the attorney has assisted or performed work; or 
(B) in which the property subject to the attorney's lien may be disposed of or otherwise encumbered; or 
(ii) by filing a separate legal action. 
(b) An attorney may not move to intervene in an action or file a separate legal action to enforce a lien before 
30 days has expired after a demand for payment has been made and not been complied with. 
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§ 38-2-7. Compensation--Attomey's lien, UT ST§ 38-2-7 
(5) An attorney may file a notice oflien: 
(a) in a pending legal action in which the attorney has assisted or performed work for which the attorney has 
a lien under this section; 
(b) with the county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this section 
is located; or 
(c) with the state or federal government office that receives filings that relate to the ownership of the property. 
(6) A notice oflien described in Subsection (5) shall include the following: 
(a) the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney claiming the lien; 
(b) the name of the client who is the owner of the property subject to the lien; 
(c) a verification that: 
(i) the property is the subject of or connected with work performed by the attorney for the client; and 
(ii)(A) the attorney made a demand for payment of the amounts owed to the attorney for the work and the 
client did not pay the amounts owed within 30 days after the day on which the attorney made the demand; or 
(B) the attorney is filing the notice of lien in accordance with a written agreement between the attorney 
and the client; 
(d) the date on which the attorney first provided services to the client; 
(e) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(f) the signature of the attorney claiming the lien; and 
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. 
(7) Within 30 days after the day on which the notice of lien is filed, the attorney shall deliver or mail by certified 
mail to the client a copy of the notice of lien. 
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§ 38-2-7. Compensation--Attomey's lien, UT ST§ 38-2-7 
(8) Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property, that is subject to an attorney's lien 
with actual or constructive knowledge of the attorney's lien, takes the interest subject to the attorney's lien. 
(9) An attorney's lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien is filed with the 
county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this section is located. 
(10) This section does not alter or diminish in any way an attorney's common law retaining lien rights. 
( 11) This section does not authorize an attorney to have a lien in the representation of a client in a criminal matter 
or domestic relations matter where a final order of divorce has not been secured unless: 
( a)(i) the criminal matter has been concluded or the domestic relations matter has been concluded by the securing 
of a final order of divorce; or 
(ii) the attorney/client relationship has terminated; and 
(b) the client has failed to fulfill the client's financial obligation to the attorney. 
Credits 
Laws 2001, c. 4, §§ I, 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 360, § I, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2015, c. 168, 
§ 1, eff. May 12, 2015. 
Notes of Decisions (54) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-7, UT ST§ 38-2-7 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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§ 38-12-103. Failure to notify-Effect-Penalty, UT ST§ 38-12-103 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 38. Liens 
Chapter 12. Notice of Lien Filing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-103 
§ 38-12-103. Failure to notify--Effect--Penalty 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A person who fails to meet the notice requirements of Subsections 38-12-102(1) and (2) is precluded from 
receiving an award of costs and attorneys' fees from the person against whom a notice of lien has been filed in an 
action to enforce the lien if costs and attorneys' fees are authorized by contract or statute. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not create a right to costs and attorneys' fees. 
(2) In addition to the penalties provided in Subsection (l)(a), a lien claimant who, within 20 days from the date 
ofreceiving notice of noncompliance with the notice requirements of Subsection 38-12-102(1) or (2), willfully 
refuses to release the notice oflien or record the lien in compliance with Section 38-12-102 is liable to the person 
against whom the notice of lien was filed for $1,000 or for treble damages, whichever is greater. 
(3) Failure to meet the notice requirements of Subsections 38-12-102(1) and (2) does not 
(a) invalidate any lien arising at common law or in equity or by any statute of this state; or 
(b) affect the rules of priority provided in Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform Commercial Code--Secured 
Transactions. 
Credits 
Laws 1995, c. 323, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 7, eff. July 1, 2001. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-103, UT ST§ 38-12-103 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document 0 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Worlcs. 
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§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings--Exceptions, UT ST§ 38-12-102 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 38. Liens 
Chapter 12. Notice of Lien Filing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-102 
§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings-Exceptions 
Currentness 
(1) A lien claimant or the lien claimant's agent shall send by certified mail a written copy of a notice of lien to 
the last-known address of the person against whom the notice of lien is filed no later than 30 days after the day 
on which the notice of lien is submitted for recording with: 
(a) a county recorder; 
(b) a county clerk; 
( c) a clerk of the court; or 
(d) in the case of a lien on an aircraft under Section 38-13-201, the Federal Aviation Administration. 
(2)(a) A notice oflien submitted for recording shall contain the following information: 
(i) the name and address of the person against whom the lien is filed; 
(ii) a statement that the property owned by the person against whom the lien is filed is subject to a lien; 
(iii)(A) the amount of the judgment, settlement, or compromise, if the lien is based on a charge against or 
interest in a judgment, settlement, or compromise; 
(B) the amount of state taxes owed, if the lien is based on unpaid state taxes; 
(C) the total amount of the unpaid assessment that is subject to the lien, including any fees, charges, or 
costs, if the lien is based on an unpaid assessment under Title 57, Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership 
Act, or Title 57, Chapter 8a, Community Association Act; or 
(D) the amount of the unpaid fine, if the lien is based on an unpaid fine under Title 57, Chapter 8, 
Condominium Ownership Act, or Title 57, Chapter 8a, Community Association Act; and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings-Exceptions, UT ST§ 38-12-102 
(iv)(A) the name, address, and phone number of the lien claimant; or 
(B) if the lien claimant has a representative for purposes of the lien, the name of the lien claimant and the 
name, address, and phone number of the lien claimant's representative. 
(b) When a lien claimant mails a copy of a notice of lien to the person against whom the notice of lien is filed, 
in accordance with Subsection (1), the notice oflien shall contain: 
(i) the requirements described in Subsection (2)(a); 
(ii) the date the notice of lien was submitted for recording; and 
(iii) the article number on the certified mail receipt. 
(3) The notice requirements of Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to: 
(a) a preconstruction or construction lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter la, Preconstruction and Construction 
Liens; 
(b) a lessors' lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 3, Lessors' Liens; 
(c) a federal tax lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 6, Federal Tax Liens; 
( d) a hospital lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 7, Hospital Lien Law; 
(e) a self-service storage facilities lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 8, Self-Service Storage Facilities; 
(f) an oil, gas, or mining lien as provided in Title 38, Chapter 10, Oil, Gas, and Mining Liens; 
(g) a claim against the Residence Lien Recovery Fund as provided in Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; 
(h) a trust deed; 
(i) a mortgage; 
(j) any interests subject to a security agreement as defined in Section 70A-9a-l 02; 
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§ 38-12-102. Notice requirements for lien filings-Exceptions, UT ST§ 38-12-102 
(k) any other liens subject to the same or stricter notice requirements than those imposed by Subsections (1) 
and (2); or 
(l) a court judgment or abstract of a court judgment presented for recording in the office of a county recorder. 
Credits 
Laws 1995, c. 323, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 6, eff. July 1, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 370, § 3, eff. 
July 1, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 187, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2012, c. 278, § 69, eff. May 8, 2012; Laws 2014, 
c. 129, § 1, eff. May 13, 2014. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-12-102, UT ST§ 38-12-102 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document c, 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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v> . 
§ 788-5-826. Attorney fees-Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees, UT ST § 78B-5-826 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence 
Part 8. Miscellaneous (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-5-826 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-56.5 
§ 78B-5-826. Attorney fees-Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees 
Currentness 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 858, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (61) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-826, UT ST§ 78B-5-826 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document 0 '.?.016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Wrona Gordon & DuBois, P.C. 
Joseph E. Wrona (#8746) 
wrona(a)wronalawfirm.com 
Jared C. Bowman (#11199) 
bowman<@wronalawfirm.com 
1745 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: ( 435) 649-2525 
Facsimile: ( 435) 649-5959 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
.. ··~~r:~·•t;·::-::--. 
The Order of Court is stated below: / . :-'· :~.: · :,, · \ 
Dated: January 22, 2014 Isl Ryan flarris~~:i } 
02: 11 :38 PM Districf{:oiirt.Ju~ge / 
•-:::,~~ I c) ',::~.~/ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, an individual; 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; HENROID, 
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah 
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; 
HIRSCID CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; and 
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO 
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. 
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MOTIONS 
Case No. 130500115 
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris 
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Defendants. 
The parties in this matter submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, and the Court issued 
notice that a hearing would take place at 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2014 to consider those motions. At 
9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2014, Joseph Wrona appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, but no one was 
present on behalf of the Defendants. At approximately 9: 15 a.m., the Court telephoned counsel for 
the Defendants, and counsel for the Defendants stated that he was unaware of the scheduled hearing. 
The parties, and the Court, all discussed whether to proceed with the hearing, and the Court 
rescheduled the commencement of the hearing to 10:00 a.m. in order to give Defendants' counsel an 
opportunity to travel to Court. 
At 10:00 a.m. on January 9, 2014, the Court reconvened the previously scheduled hearing, 
and Mr. Wrona was again present in Court on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and Mr. David M. Corbett 
was present on behalf of the Defendants. The Court stated that during the recess that it had 
researched the manner in which notice of the hearing had been distributed, and had confirmed that 
proper notice had been issued to at least one of the Defendants' attorneys ofrecord in this matter. 
The Court then proceeded to hear oral argument on the motions for summary judgment, but the 
Court did not expressly ask for oral argument on Plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the 
declaration of Steve Christensen. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court issued an oral 
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ruling from the bench. 
The Court found that the following facts are undisputed: 
1. The vast majority of the legal work performed by Defendant Steve Christensen for 
Plaintiff Charles Rehn related to Mr. Rehn' s divorce; 
2. There was no real property at issue at issue in the divorce; 
3. At most, and viewing all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the Defendants, 
Mr. Christensen provided $30.00 of billable time work that could arguably be related to a decision 
by Mr. Rehn to purchase 4118 Saddleback Road (the "Property") some date in the future; 
4. All other billable work was unrelated to the Property; 
5. Utah's attorney lien statute does not authorize attorneys to record an attorney's lien 
against property for amounts owed to an attorney that are unrelated to the property in question; 
6. The Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC") representation agreement with Mr. Rehn 
includes a phrase that recites HNC's right to record a lien pursuant to Utah's attorney lien statute; 
7. The fact that the Defendants have judicially admitted that there was no contractual right to 
record a lien reinforces the Court's conclusion regarding the interpretation of the HNC 
representation agreement. 
In light of these undisputed facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
1. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff regarding Count I of the 
Plaintiffs Complaint, and the Court construes Count I of the Plaintiffs Complaint as a Quiet Title 
claim. The Court concludes that there is no statute of limitations that applies to a Quiet Title claim, 
and even if one of the Defendants originally had the right to record a lien against the property in the 
amount of $30.00, it is undisputed that Mr. Rehn paid Defendants more than $30.00 after that 
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purported work was performed and prior to the recording of the lien. Therefore, the Court grants 
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Count I of their Complaint, and the Court quiets title 
and renders the lien void. The Court orders the $40,000 currently held in escrow to be immediately 
released to Mr. Rehn or to Wrona, Gordon & DuBois. 
2. With regard to Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint, the claim set forth in Count II of that 
Complaint is mooted by the Court's ruling and by the prior temporary relief granted in this case 
releasing the lien in consideration of the escrowing of $40,000 in sale proceeds. 
3. With regard to Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court denies summary judgment to 
either party on that Count and finds that issues of fact exist with regard to the Defendant's intent 
when the lien was recorded. Therefore, Count III can only be resolved through a trial on the merits. 
4. With regard to Count IV of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court denies each of the Parties' 
motions for summary judgment on that Count and finds that genuine issues of fact exist regarding 
the interpretation of the letter issued by Mr. Christensen to Mr. Rehn, and regarding the running of 
any applicable statute of limitations. 
5. With regard to Count V of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court finds that Count Vis barred by 
the statute of limitations and grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment and orders the 
dismissal of Count V of Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. 
THEREFORE, Plaintiffs summary judgment motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
IN PART, as set forth herein. Defendants' summary judgment is also GRANTED IN PART and 
DENIED IN PART, as set forth herein. The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the $40,000 currently 
held in escrow be released to Mr. Rehn and/or his attorneys of record, and the Court directs the title 
company holding that money in escrow to release to the escrowed amount immediately. Plaintiffs' 
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Motion to Strike portions of Mr. Christensen's declaration is DENIED. 
Tf?.e Court has reviewed Defendants' objection to the form of this order and has made 
appropriate modifications. 
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WRONA GoRDON & DUBolS, P.C. 
Joseph E. Wrona (#8746) 
wrona@wgdlawfirm.com 
Jared C. Bowman (#11199) 
bgwmap@wgdlawfirm.com 
1745 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (435) 649-2S2S 
Facsimile: ( 435) 649-S959 
AJtorneys for Plaintiffs 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT· SUMMIT 
· JAN -·s 2015 \ ,.\\J A·Wl. 
FILED ll't lli½,i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRicr COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
.smVE s. CHRISTENSEN, an. individual; 
STEVES. CBRIS~SEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; BENROID, 
M.£LSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah 
general partnersbip; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBEIT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; and 
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO· 
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. 
I: i . Defendants. 
i I 'I 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 130500115 
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris 
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l 
This matter came before· the Court for a jury trial on December 9-10, 2014, with David 
M. Corbett of Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz., PLLC representing Defendant Steve S. 
Christensen \'Christensen'') and Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Steve 8. _ Christensen, P~C. 
(''SSC"), and Joseph B. Wrona of Wrona, Gordon & DuBois, P .C. representing Plaintiff Charles 
C. Rehn ("Rehn") and Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 4118 Saddleback Road, ParkCity, Utah 
(the ''Property") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs'?, On December 9-10, 2014 the Parties 1ried_the 
following issues to a jury: (1) whether Christensen and SSC act.ed with malice when they 
recorded the Amended Notice of Attorney Lien, Entry No. 00594032, Bk. 01384, Pg. 00187 on 
July 25, 200l(the "Lien'') against the Property; and (2) whether the Plmntiffs suffered damages, 
and in what amount Prior to trial, the Court granted summary judgment; in favor of the J>labrtiffs 
on the -~hlintiffs' cause of action for declaratory judgment, which the Court construed as a quiet 
title action and deemed the Plaintiffs' cause- of action for an injunction moot. Prior to trial, the 
Court also found that the Plaintiffs had established the first two elements· of their Slander of Title 
claim as .a matter of Jaw. Prior to trial, the Court further dismissed the PlaintiJfs' claim for 
wron!@ll lien as being outside the $tote of limitations. 
• •I I 
On December 10, 2014, the jury in this action found that Christensen and SSC acted with 
lilalice and the jury awarded $77,752.29 in consequential _damages. In the wale~ of that jury 
verdict, the Plaintiffs withdrew their promissory estoppel claim in order to_ conserve the 
resources of 1he Court and the Parties. 
2 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Ba.,ed upon the findings and conclusions of the Court and the Jury, THE COURT 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES 1HAT: 
1. Tho P1aintiffs, First Cause of Action (Declaratory Judgment against All 
Defendants) was proven as a matter of law on January 22, 2014. 
2. The Plaintiffst Second Cause of Action (Permanent Injmiction · against All 
Defendants) 'WU disrnfS-cred with prejudice as moot on January 22, 2014. 
3. The Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action (Slander of Trtle against Christensen and 
SSC) has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
4. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action (Promissory Estoppel against Christensen 
and SSC) has been withdrawn. 
S, The Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action (Wrongful !Jen against ~nsen and 
SSC) was dismissed as a matter oflaw on January 22, 2014. 
6. SSC•s Fll'St -Qwse of Action (Enforcement of Lien Against the Saddleback 
Property) was dismissed as a matter of law on January 22, 2014. 
. . 
7. The Court therefore grants relief and money damages to the Plaintiffs on their 
. . . 
Slander of Title Claim against Christensen and SSC in the following amounts: 
I. 
a. $77,752.29, ~enting the special damages of attorney's fees and costs that 
Rehn paid to remove the cloud.placed on his title by the Lien; 
b. Post-Judgment Interest at the rate ofi!I&% per annum; and 
. 2.211, 
3@ 
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Q.... 4 ddkigaal eeets end auemey fees as the _prer,'aiHBg pmty m the emetmt of s,__ 
s~=====-~-o-... @ . 
8. The total amount of the monetary j~ent awarded to Rehn is $77,752.~ plus- @ 
lbe addm:eB&I eeotB and attomc1s' fees to in the amouat of$ _____ :far totm award of Q. • 
$ . 
BY THE COURT: 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to 'the following 
people for case 130500115 by the method and on the date specified. 
MANUAL EMAIL: DAVID M CORBETT dmc@ccplawyers.com 
MANUAL EMAIL: JOSEPH E WRONA wrona@wgdlawf irm. com 
01/08/2015 /s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of this document was sent to the following people 
for case 130500115 by the method and on the date specified. 
MANUAL EMAIL: DAVID M CORBETT dmc@ccplawye:rs.com 
MANUAL EMAIL: JOSEPH E WRONA wrona®wgdlawf irm. com 
01/08/2015 /s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ADDENDUM 6: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or Motion for New Trial 
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David M. Corbett (U.S.B. No. 13946) 
dmc@ccpla"WVers.com 
Craig L. Pankratz (U.S.B. No. 12194) 
CHRISTENSEN CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
Attornrys far Steve 5. Christensen, Steve 5. Christensen, P.C., Christensen Corbett & PankratZ; PLLC, and 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SU:M1vilT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and that 
certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, an individual; 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; HENROID, 
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah 
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; and ALL 
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO CLAIM 
ANY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE ACTION. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT, OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 130500115 
Judge Ryan Harris 
COME NOW Defendants, Steve S. Christensen and Steve S. Christensen, P.C. (collectively 
"Steve"), and submit this memorandum in support of motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, motion to alter or amend judgment, and motion for a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint on February 15, 2013. The complaint asserted 
five causes of action: (1) A declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that the lien was unenforceable 
and void ab initio; (2) A permanent injunction prohibiting efforts to enforce the lien; (3) Slander of 
Title; (4) Estoppel; and (5) Wrongful Lien. 
2. Steve filed a counter-claim seeking enforcement of his attorney lien. 
3. On February 26, 2013, the Court issued a temporary restraining order vacating Steve's 
attorney lien that would be effective once Plaintiffs posted a $40,000 bond. 
4. On March 11, 2013, the Court entered a preliminary injunction that voided the lien 
based on the stipulation of the parties after Plaintiffs placed $40,000 into escrow. 
5. On January 22, 2014, the Court entered its Order on Summary Judgment Motions. The 
Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on his first cause of action ( declaratory judgment) and 
determined that the second cause of action (injunctive relief) was moot. The Court denied summary 
judgment to either party on the slander of title cause of action because of the factual issues related to 
Defendants' intent when the lien was recorded. The Court denied summary judgment on the 
estoppel cause of action because of factual issues. And the Court dismissed the Wrongful Lien cause 
of action. 
6. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to strike portions of Steve's declaration, which was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
The jury's verdict and the Court's judgment awarding Plaintiff $77,752.29 in consequential 
damages are not supported by the evidence presented at trial on Plaintiff's claim for slander of title. 
A court may enter judgment notwithstanding a jury's verdict, alter or amend its judgment, or grant a 
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new trial if there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. U.RC.P. SO(b) & 59(a)(6), (e). To 
prevail on a claim for slander of title, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to prove that a 
slanderous statement caused special damages. Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 79, 247 P.3d 380. Attorney 
fees are special damages caused by a slanderous statement if they were "reasonably necessary ... to 
remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value by disparagement." Id. at ,r 82. Therefore, before a 
plaintiff may award attorney fees for slander of title, the evidence must be sufficient to prove that (1) 
his requested award of attorney fees was actually incurred to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility 
or value of property by disparagement and (2) the attorney fees are reasonable. 
I. Plaintiff failed to prove that $43,916.43 of his requested costs and attorney fees were actually 
incurred to remove Steve's attorney lien. 
The evidence was insufficient to prove that Plaintiff incurred $77,752.29 in costs and 
attorney fees to remove the doubt cast the vendibility or value of his property by Steve's attorney 
lien. The Utah Supreme Court has held, 
An award of attorney fees must be based on the evidence and supported by findings 
of fact. ... One who seeks an award of attorney fees, therefore, has the burden of 
producing evidence to buttress the requested award. . . . When the evidence 
presented is insufficient, an award of attorney fees cannot stand. . . . In this regard, 
. . . a party seeking attorney fees must allocate its fee request according to its 
underlying claims. 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). If a plaintiff fails to allocate fees in whole or in part, an 
award of attorney fees should be denied or reduced accordingly. See Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 
318, 1J 42, 35 P.3d 341;Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden Ci!J Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, 1J 32, 26 P.3d 
872; A.K&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, 1J 33, 977 P.2d 518. And 
"[w]hile a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for failure to allocate, ... it may not 
award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate claims 
and/or parties." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). Thus, to prove that attorney 
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fees were caused by and reasonably necessary to remove doubt caused by a slanderous statement, a 
plaintiff bears the burden to apportion or allocate the fees he incurred into three categories: (1) fees 
incurred on successful claims for which attorney fees are recoverable, (2) fees incurred for 
unsuccessful claims for which attorney fees are recoverable, an~ (3) fees incurred on unsuccessful 
claims for which attorney fees are not recoverable. See Sumner Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Rio Mesa 
Holdings, ILC, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 139-40 (Ct. App. 2012); see also Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. 
Plaintiff's evidence parti.ally allocates the attorney fees incurred in this matter. The partial 
allocation of attorney fees reveals that the jury awarded attorney fees incurred working on Plaintiffs 
unsuccessful claims and motions and on work performed for unrelated matters. It also reveals that 
the jury awarded attorney fees where the evidence is insufficient to ascertain as to whether the fees 
were incurred working on successful or unsuccessful claims. The Court should subtract the jury's 
award of these fees from the judgment entered in this case. 
A. The jury improperly awarded $11 321.50 in attorney fees for unsuccessful claims. 
unsuccessful motions and work unrelated to removal of the lien. 
The jury improperly awarded attorney fees for work Plaintiffs' attorneys performed related 
to bankruptcy, bar complaints, Utah's wrongful lien statute, civil conspiracy, intentional interference 
with economic relations, promissory estoppel, permanent injunctions after the lien had already been 
voided, equitable estoppel, and an unsuccessful motion to strike Steve's declaration. Inasmuch as 
this work was performed on unsuccessful claims, unsuccessful motions, claims unrelated to removal 
of the lien, and/ or after the Court voided the lien, the attorney fees incurred were not reasonably 
necessary to remove the lien. Therefore, the jury improperly awarded them to Plaintiffs, and this 
Court should reduce the verdict and judgment accordingly. 
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The following chart lists the work performed and attorney fees incurred on unsuccessful 
claims, unsuccessful motions, and/ or claims unrelated to removal of the lien: 
DATE DESCRIPTION Arn HRS RATE AMT 
Jan-07-13 Review docket ~om client's 2004 bankruptcy; pull BCJ .7 $90.00 $63.00 
schedules to determine if attomey Christensen was 
listed as creditor; pull Hirschi Christensen documents 
from Division of Corporations to determine that 
attorney Christensen was part of firm; meeting with J. 
Wrona re: same. 
Jan-25-13 Research existence of Steve S. Christensen,P.C. (0.8); JCB 1.0 $195.00 $195.00 
Research Steve Christensen's employment history (0.2). 
Research attorney lien statute and legislative history for JCB 1.2 $195.00 $234.00 
possible remedy to strike lien. 
Begin researching possible remedies through JCB .30 $195.00 $58.50 
bankruptcy court. 
Research abusive liens JCB .30 $195.00 $58.50 
Teleconference with Charlie reearding invoices ]CB .10 $195.00 $19.50 
Jan-28-13 Review and analyze email from Charlie regarding JCB .1 $195.00 $19.50 
additional invoices 
lan-29-13 Evaluate invoices JCB 1.0 $195.00 $195.00 
Evaluate potential of striking attorney lien through JCB 1.5 $195.00 $292.50 
s .............. ~ 1 proceedings for wrongful lien. 
Research bankruptcy filings for additional evidence to JCB 0.40 $195.00 $78.00 
strike attorney lien. 
Research case law regarding method of sanctioning JCB 0.50 $195.00 $97.50 
Christensen in bankruptcy court. 
Continue researching wrongful lien case law and JCB 1.40 $195.00 $273.00 
statutes. 
Feb-12-13 Attorney conference regarding the issues ]TC .7 $225.00 $157.50 
related to the filing of a wrongful lien 
injunction under Utah law and the factual 
issues in the case (0. 7). 
Research civil conspiracy as possible claim. ]CB .1 $195.00 $19.50 
Begin researching cause of action for intentional JCB .20 $195.00 $39.00 
interference with economic relations. 
Research additional causes of action. TCB .6 $195.00 $117.00 
Feb-14-13 Evaluate, research, and assess potential new theory of JCB 2.0 $195.00 $390.00 
wrongful lien. 
Feb-15-13 Work with TTC on wron(?ful lien ar(?Wllents. JCB .3 $195.00 $58.50 
Feb-19-13 Begin drafting Proposed Wrongful Lien Injunction and JCB .60 $195.00 $117.00 
Temporary Restraining Order. 
Feb-26-13 Reviewed and analyzed the petition for wrongful lien JTC 1.10 $225.00 $247.50 
injunction and also conversed with Jared and Joe about 
the process of filing a wrongful lien petition (1.1). 
Mar-06-13 Email Charlie about the status of closing. JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Mar-07-13 Email Charlie to follow-up on closing. JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Jun-27-13 Research Christensen's argument regarding wrongful JCB 1.00 $215.00 $215.00 
lien claim. 
Research elements of permanent injunction JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
and interplay with statute of limitations. 
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Jul-03-13 Research case law regarding policy of promoting JCB .4 $215.00 $86.00 
alienability of land. 
Research elements of promissory estoppel and ]CB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
interplay with statute of limitations. 
Research wrongful lien claim and interplay JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
with statute of limitations. 
Research bankruptcv effect on lien. JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
Jul-23-13 Research case law regarding equitable estoppel JCB 0.70 $215.00 $150.50 
to include in Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summarv J udt?II1ent. 
Aug-28-13 Work with estoppel doctrines as they relate to ]CB .6 $215.00 $129.00 
summary judement motion. 
Oct-17-13 Edit summary judgment to get wrongful lien JEW .5 $350.00 $175.00 
damages into brief; working on trebling 
damages f.51 
Nov-01-13 Begin evaluating possibility of motion to strike ]CB .4 $215.00 $86.00 
Christensen's declaration. 
Nov-04-13 Continue evaluating possibility of motion to strike JCB 1.2 $215.00 $258.00 
Christensen's declaration. 
Nov-07-13 Review Bowman memo on striking portions of JEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
Christensen affidavit; working w / Bowman on 
structure of a motion to strike f .31 
Nov-14-13 Begin drafting Memorandum. in Support of Motion to ]CB 4.60 $215.00 $989.00 
Strike Portions of Christensen's Declaration. 
Research case law reearding striking affidavit JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
Nov-15-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion ]CB 4.10 $215.00 $881.50 
to Strike Portions of Christensen's Declaration. 
Nov-19-13 .Attorney conference regarding the issues surrounding a JTC 0.70 $225.00 $157.50 
claim of wrongful lien as they relate to the attorney's 
lien filed in the case (0.7). 
Draft Motion to Strike Portions of Christensen's ]CB 0.50 $215.00 $107.50 
Declaration. 
Nov-20-13 Draft Notice of Filing of Affidavit and of JCB 0.40 $215.00 $86.00 
Supplemental Authority. 
Dec-10-13 Document review for documents produced to DJO .9 $175.00 $157.50 
compare to documents attached to defendants' 
opposition to motion to strike; prepare 
documents for Jared to review for his reply. 
Review and analyze Defendants' Opposition to Motion JCB 1.00 $215.00 $215.00 
to Strike Portions of Christensen's affidavit. 
Research past misconduct of Christensen. JCB 0.70 $215.00 $150.50 
Dec-12-13 Scrutinize Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Strike JCB 0.80 $215.00 $172.00 
and formulate counterarguments to 
the same. 
Begin drafting Reply in Support of Motion to ]CB 6.60 $215.00 $1,419.00 
Strike Portions of Christensen's Declaration. 
Work with DJO on drafting his affidavit to support JCB 0.10 $215.00 $21.50 
Reply in Support of Motion to Strike. 
Dec-13-13 Editing reply to motion to strike f.61 JEW .6 $350.00 $210.00 
Continue working on Reply in Support of Motion to JCB 1.20 $215.00 $258.00 
Strike. 
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Dec-14-13 Working on reply to motion to strike; working JEW 0.40 $350.00 $140.00 
on Christensen's penchant for constantly 
misrepresenting facts f .41 
Work with JEW on arguments for Reply in Support of ]CB 0.20 $215.00 $43.00 
Motion to Strike. 
Dec-16-13 Final edits to reply f .51 TEW .5 $350.00 $175.00 
Document review of intial [sic.] disclosures, and DJO 1.4 $175.00 $245.00 
responses to discovery requests; compare 
documents and find support for our reply in 
support of motion to strike. 
Finalize Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Portions ]CB 2.50 $215.00 $537.50 
of Christensen's Declaration. 
Draft Motion and Proposed Order for ]CB 0.40 $215.00 $86.00 
Overleneth Reply Memorandum. 
Dec-17-13 Prepare table of contents and table of authorities for BC] 1.10 $100.00 $110.00 
reply memorandum in support of motion to strike 
Christensen Declaration. 
Jan-8-14 Assist in preparing for hearing on motion to strike. TCB 2.80 $215.00 $602.00 
Jan-14-14 Research possible attorneys' fees exposure for ]CB 0.20 $215.00 $43.00 
wrongful lien. 
TOTALS 53.6 $11,321.50 
B. The jury improperly awarded $32 594.93 in costs and attorney fees because Plaintiffs failed 
to allocate them. 
Plaintiffs failed to allocate many of their costs and attorney fees. The failure to allocate 
makes it impossible to determine whether they were incurred for successful or unsuccessful claims. 
Because it is impossible to determine, Plaintiffs failed to prove that they were reasonably necessary 
to remove the lien, and the Court must reduce the verdict and judgment accordingly. 
The following chart summarizes the attorney fees that Plaintiffs failed to allocate: 
DATE DESCRIPTION ATrY HRS RATE AMT 
Jan-07-13 Correspond w / Charles; teleconference w / JEW 1.0 $350.00 $350.00 
Charles; teleconference w / Maria at title 
company; review bankruptcy related issues 
fl.01 
Jan-26-13 Review and analyze email from client and forward ]CB .2 $195.00 $19.50 
onto JEW for review 
Jan-29-13 Attorney conference with Jared Bowman regarding the JTC .7 $225.00 $157.50 
facts and legal issues of client's case and provided 
advice ... on matters of liens and wronclul liens (0. 7) 
Email Charlie to update him on status of research and ]CB 0.40 $195.00 $78.00 
progress in investigating the removal of Christensen's 
Llen. 
Begin reviewing and analvzine email from Charlie. JCB 0.20 $195.00 $39.00 
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Jan-31•13 Received, reviewed and analyzed two cases JTC 1.40 $225.00 $315.00 
from Jared Bowan and conference [sic.] with rum 
about the applicability of those cases to the 
client's matter (1.4). 
Work with JC on lien issues and potential JCB .5 $195.00 $97.50 
remedies. 
Work with BKC on potential bankruptcy and ]CB .3 $195.00 $58.50 
lien issues. 
Feb-06-13 Review Christensen documents and working JEW .4 $350.00 $140.00 
on issues raised bv those documents r.41 
Review and analyze letter and documents from JCB .9 $195.00 $175.50 
Steve S. Christensen 
Teleconference with Charlie and follow•up email per ]CB .6 $195.00 $117.00 
Charlie's request. 
Beein drafting Verified Complaint. JCB 5.50 $195.00 $1,072.50 
Email update and letter to Charlie. JCB .4 $195.00 $78.00 
Feb-13-13 Editing complaint; working on what is needed JEW .80 $350.00 $280.00 
for preliminary injunction; revise complaint to 
lay groundwork for preliminary injunction r.81 
Review, analyze, and respond to Charlie's emails. JCB .80 $195.00 $156.00 
Continue working on the Verified Complaint. JCB 2.4 $195.00 $468.00 
Work with JEW on Verified Complaint and strategy. ]CB .30 $195.00 $58.50 
Feb-14-13 Continue working on Verified Complaint. JCB 2.1 $195.00 $409.50 
Feb-15-13 Researched the issues and had an attorney conference JTC 1.1 $225.00 $247.50 
with Jared Bowman regarding the application of the 
wrongful lien statute in light of the facts provided by 
client pertaining to the time frame that he obtained the 
property that is the subject of the lien (1.1). 
Begin drafting Memorandum in Support of Wrongful ]CB 4.70 $195.00 $916.50 
Lien Injunction and TRO. 
Feb-19-13 Editing Court pleadings r.81 JEW .8 $350.00 $280.00 
Continue working on Memorandum in Support ]CB 2.3 $195.00 $448.50 
of Wrongful Lien Petition and TRO/Preliminary 
Injunction. 
Continue drafting Petition for Wrongful Lien ]CB .80 $195.00 $156.00 
Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction. 
Prepare notice of lawsuit and request for BCJ 1.3 $100.00 $130.00 
waiver of service of summons and waiver of 
service of summons for all defendants; email 
same to Christensen; look up client's property records 
in Summit county to determine 
ownership; review trust deed containing client 
and wife's signatures; prepare power of 
attorney; email same to client. 
Feb-20-13 Editing memorandum for TRO; editing motion; JEW 1.80 $350.00 $630.00 
working on memo and motion for TRO r1.s1 
Finalize Memorandum for TRO /Petition for ]CB 2.20 $195.00 $429.00 
Wrongful Lien Injunction. 
Feb-25-13 General hearing preparation for tomorrows [sic.] JEW 2.00 $350.00 $700.00 
hearing; outline basic arguments to make at tomorrows 
rsic.1 hearing; check to determine whether opposition 
ADDENDUM 6 R. 03663 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been filed; pull cases and review cases; identify 
need for case on uniqueness of real property; 
researching whether opposing counsel is subject to bar 
complaint (3 hours actual, cha.me 2 hours)r2.0l 
Assist in preparations for Wrongful Lien/TRO JCB .90 $195.00 $175.50 
Hearing. 
Feb-26-13 Prepare for hearing; reviewing brief; reviewing JEW 6.00 $350.00 $2,100.00 
exhibits; rev-iewing case law; reviewing 
statutes; working on blow up; pulling excerpts 
to provide to Court; preparing arguments; 
travel to Court; obtain opposition and review 
same; conduct Court hearing; working on 
order after Court (8 hours actual, charge 6 
hours) f6.0l 
Assist in preparations for TRO/Wrongful Lien JCB 1.40 $195.00 $273.00 
Hearing. 
Review and analyze opposition memorandum obtained JCB 0.60 $195.00 $117.00 
from Court's web site. 
Feb-28-13 Meeting with Charlie regarding allegations in JCB .40 $195.00 $78.00 
Christensen's Opposition. 
Mar-06-13 Working on closing; working on preliminary JEW .4 $350.00 $140.00 
injunction w / Tared f.41 
Apr-11-13 Coordinate with staff on deadlines for JCB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
discovery and Reply to Counterclaim. 
Email Answer and Counterclaim to Charlie for JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
review. 
Review and analyze Answer and Counterclaim TCB 1.1 $215.00 $236.50 
Teleconference with Charlie regarding JCB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
responding to .Answer and Counterclaim. 
Apr-12-13 Obtain and review Christensen's answer; JEW .7 $350.00 $245.00 
review Bowman's memo on motion to dismiss; 
working on whether to file motion to dismiss 
or whether to proceed with litieation Pl 
Apr-15-13 Review counterclaim to determine whether JEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
12(b)(6) motion should be filed; working on 
strategy for s .................. v judement f.31 
Mav-20-13 Respond to Charlie's email inquiries. TCB .s $215.00 $107.50 
Jun-26-13 Begin researching case law regarding Christensen's JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
ar2Uffients in Opposition Memorandum. 
Jul-19-13 Work with JEW on strategy for motion for partial JCB .20 $215.00 $43.00 
Suu.uu.uy jud21I1ent. 
Begin drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion for JCB 2.60 $215.00 $559.00 
Partial S-........ v lud21Ilent. 
Jul-22-13 Formulating arguments for Memorandum in Support JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
of Motion for Partial Summary ludrnient. 
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion JCB 2.50 $215.00 $537.50 
for Partial Summarv ludrnient. 
Jul-23-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion JCB 2.60 $215.00 $559.00 
for Partial S ................ A.&. v ludrnient. 
Jul-24-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion JCB 4.40 $215.00 $946.00 
for Partial S ludrnient 
Jul-25-13 Correspond w / client; working on Swrunarv judgment JEW .20 $350.00 $70.00 
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r.21 
Jul-26-13 Review, analyze and respond to Charlie's email JCB .70 $215.00 $150.50 
inquiries regarding items to be done and schedule of 
events. 
.Aug-12-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion JCB 1.50 $215.00 $322.50 
for Partial S .................... y Jude:ment. 
.Aug-13-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion JCB 0.90 $215.00 $193.50 
for Partial Summarv J ude:ment. 
.Aug-14-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion ]CB 1.80 $215.00 $387.00 
for Partial Summary Judgment against 
Christensen et al. 
.Aug-15-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of ]CB 0.50 $215.00 $107.50 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against 
Christensen et al. 
.Aug-16-13 Work with JEW on ar2U111ents for Suirnu;uy judgment. JCB 0.10 $215.00 $21.50 
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion ]CB 1.70 $215.00 $365.50 
for Partial SummarvJude:ment. 
.Aug-26-13 Working on motion for sui.1u1=i.r judgment f.31 JEW 0.30 $350.00 $105.00 
Teleconference with Charlie regarding Motion for JCB 0.30 $215.00 $64.50 
Partial Summarv Judgment and strategy. 
.Aug-27-13 Editing summarv judgment motion f.81 JEW .8 $350.00 $280.00 
Review, analyze, and respond to email inquiries from JCB 0.30 $215.00 $64.50 
Charlie. 
.Aug-28-13 Two major edits to summary judgment motion; JEW 1.00 $350.00 $350.00 
working w / Bowman on additional facts and 
weaving deposition testimony into summary 
jude:ment motion fl.01 
Two major edits to summary judgment motion; JEW 1.8 $350.00 $630.00 
working w / Bowman on additional facts and 
weaving deposition testimony into summary judgment 
motion fl.81 
.Aug-29-13 Working on s ............. ~, jude:ment motion f.41 JEW .4 $350.00 $140.00 
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of JCB 2.2 $215.00 $473.00 
Motion for Partial S ............. ~r Jude:ment. 
Oct-17-13 Work with JEW on Motion for Partial Summary ]CB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
Jud2I11ent. 
Finalize Memorandum in Support of Motion for JCB 1.4 $215.00 $301.00 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
Draft Motion for Partial Summarv Judgment. JCB .8 $215.00 $172.00 
Compile specific exhibits for Memorandum in Support ]CB 1.1 $215.00 $236.50 
of Motion for Partial S..u .............. y Judgment. 
Oct-29-13 Review cross motion for summary judgment and work JEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
w/ Jared on same f.31 
Begin reviewing and analyzing Christensen's Cross- ]CB 1.2 $215.00 $258.00 
Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying 
memorandum. 
Oct-31-13 Formulate strategy for responding to Christensen's JCB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
Brief. 
Oct-31-13 Begin scrutinizing Christensen's Opposition and JCB .9 $215.00 $193.50 (&, 
Memorandum supporting Cross-Motion. 
Nov-01-13 Continue evaluating arguments in Christensen's JCB 1.0 $215.00 $215.00 
Memorandum. 
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Nov-07-13 Continue formulating arguments regarding ]CB .7 $215.00 $150.50 
Reply/Opposition regarding Summary Judgment 
Motions. 
Nov-08-13 Working on opposition of Summary judgment; JEW .5 $350.00 $175.00 
working on motion to strike; correspond w / Bowman 
f.51 
Begin drafting .Analysis section of Summary Judgment ]CB 3.20 $215.00 $688.00 
Reply/ Opposition. 
Nov-11-13 Continue drafting detailed Counter arguments in ]CB 6.90 $215.00 $1,483.50 
analysis section of Opposition/Reply regarding 
SummarvJudementMotions 
Nov-12-13 Continue drafting Memorandum in Reply/Opposition ]CB 2.80 $215.00 $602.00 
to SUJ.u.u.i.u V Judement. 
Edits re Plaintiffs' Combined Reply CST 3.00 $75.00 $225.00 
Nov-18-13 :Major re-write of opposition/ reply; working on case JEW 2.20 $350.00 $770.00 
law to support argument; working w / Bowman on 
argument; major re-write of motion to strike and 
memorandum in support of same; working on Rule 
56(i) are:uments f2.21 
Work with JEW on Opposition/Reply Memorandum ]CB 0.20 $215.00 $43.00 
rel?a!ding SUJ..1.11.1.uUv Judement. 
Continue drafting Reply/Opposition Memorandum ]CB 2.90 $215.00 $623.50 
for Partial SUJ..1111= v Judement. 
Nov-19-13 Editing combined opposition and reply brief JEW 2.60 $350.00 $910.00 
throughout day; working on responses to statements 
of facts; review Rehn affidavits; working on additional 
case citation and review cases; editing memorandum in 
support of motion to strike; working on briefs 
throughout dav f2.6l 
Finalize Combined Memorandum regarding Summary ]CB 1.1 $215.00 $236.50 
Judgment (1.1); 
Prepare table of contents and table of authorities for BC] 1.60 $100.00 $160.00 
combined opposition and reply to cross motions for 
s ____ -~ u judement. 
Nov-27-13 Review, analyze, and respond to Charlie's email ]CB 0.40 $215.00 $86.00 
inquiry. 
Dec-10-13 Work with JEW on arguments from opposing ]CB .6 $215.00 $129.00 
counsel's email. 
Dec-17-13 Work with SKG on hearing for summary judgment ]CB 0.30 $215.00 $64.50 
motions and motion to strike. 
Prepare request to submit for decision on plaintiff's BC] 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
motion for partial summary judgment, defendants' 
motion for partial summary judgment and plaintiffs 
motion to strike Christensen Declaration. 
Dec-30-13 Research factual basis for counte.ramuments. TCB .60 $215.00 $129.00 
Work with JEW on preparation for Summary JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
Judgment/Motion to Strike Hearing. 
Jan-02-14 Research case law regarding inappropriateness of ]CB .3 $215.00 $64.50 
raising issues for the first time on reply. 
Jan-07-14 Initial preparation for hearing; working on editing JEW 1.30 $350.00 $455.00 
opposition to motion to amend. f 1.31 
Assist in preparing for hearing on motions for ]CB 4.50 $215.00 $967.50 
s ...... ~ .. -... v judement and motion to strike. 
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Work with CSTon rsic.l preparing for hearing. JCB 0.30 $215.00 $64.50 
Jan-08-14 Prepare for hearing and work with two huge binders JEW 3.00 $350.00 $1,050.00 
forhearingpreparation.r3.0] 
Jan-09-14 Early morning prep for hearing; travel to hearing; JEW 2.30 $350.00 $805.00 
conduct hearing and obtain release of escrow deposit; 
follow-up work on order afterwards. f2.3l 
Jan-10-14 Working on follow-up from yesterdays [sic.] hearing. JEW 0.30 $350.00 $105.00 
f.31 
TOTALS 126.3 $29,998.50 
The following chart summarizes the costs that Plaintiffs failed to allocate: 
DATE COST AMOUNT 
Feb-01-13 Lexis Nexis $168.08 
Feb-28-13 Lexis Nexis $439.81 
.Apr-30-13 Lexis Nexis $85.23 
Jun-30-13 Lexis Nexis $231.85 
Jul-31-13 Lexis Nexis $980.71 
Aug-31-13 Lexis Nexis $20.79 
Dec-01-13 Lexis Nexis $503.41 
Jan-31-14 Lexis Nexis $166.55 
TOTALS $2,596.43 
IL The remainder of the awarded attorney fees are still unreasonable. 
After deducting the costs and fees that Plaintiffs failed to prove were necessary to remove 
the lien, there remains $33,835.86, but this amount is not reasonable and should be reduced to 
$20,000. An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence and supported by findings of fact. 
Cottonwood, 830 P .2d at 268. A trial judge is not compelled to accept "self-interested testimony whole 
cloth" and award all fees requested. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988). 
Instead, the trial court "must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
requested fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Cottonwood, 830 P.2d at 269. Among 
others, a court must consider the following factors: 
1. the difficulty of the litigation; 
2. the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case; 
3. the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case; 
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4. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; 
5. the amount in controversy and the result attained; and 
6. the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. 
Bracken, 7 64 P .2d at 989. The number of hours spent on the case is not determinative: "The 
appropriateness of the work actually performed and of the attorney's billing rate is evaluated before 
a reasonable fee is set." Id. at 990. 
Considering these factors, the remaining $33,835.86 is an unreasonable fee for the work 
performed. The litigation from filing to summary judgment was not particularly difficult. As 
illustrated by the examples below, Plaintiffs' attorneys were extremely inefficient. While the charge 
per hour of Plaintiffs' attorneys and support staff are fees customarily charged in the locality, the 
amount in controversy, $40,000, was too low to justify the amount of hours spent on this case. 
Finally, Mr. \Vrona and Mr. Bowman are experienced and intelligent attorneys who should have 
been able to efficiently prosecute Plaintiffs' claims against Steve. 
The most glaring example of inefficiency is the work expended to obtain Bruce Lindell's 
affidavit. The affidavit is only seven sentences long. But, as illustrated below, Plaintiffs' attorneys 
spent 5.1 hours and billed $1,256.00 to prepare it. This is inefficient and unreasonable. 
DATE DESCRIPTION AITY HRS RATE AMT 
May-27-13 Correspond 111/ Charlie on Bruce Lindell; write JEW .5 $350.00 $175.00 
up outline for obtaining summary judgment if 
we are successful in obtaining affidavit from 
Bruce Lindell f.51 
May-28-13 Working on discovery requests edits; working on JEW .5 $350.00 $105.00 
strategy for Bruce Lindell 
Review and analyze email from Charlie about Bruce ]CB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Lindell 
Email Charlie about speaking with Lindell JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Jun-07-13 Quick meeting with Charlie [.3] JEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
Meeting with Charlie and Joe reearcling Lindell JCB .3 $215.00 $64.50 
lun-20-13 Work with JEW on Lindell Affidavit JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Beirin drafting Affidavit of Bruce Lindell. JCB 1.8 $215.00 $387.00 
Jun-21-13 Working on red.line of Lindell affidavit [.4] JEW .4 $350.00 $140.00 
Continue drafting Lindell's Affidavit. JCB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
Email Charlie a draft of Lindell's Affidavit JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
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Jul-11-13 Email Charlie regarding Christensen,s deposition and JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Lindell Affidavit 
Jul-25-13 Email Charlie regarding meeting with Lindell, JCB .40 $215.00 $86.00 
payment, and discovery responses. 
Aug-12-13 Email Charlie to follow-up on Lindell Affidavit JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Email Charlie to follow-up on Lindell Affidavit JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
TOTALS 5.1 $1,256.00 
As another glaring example of inefficiency, as illustrated below, Plaintiffs' attorneys spent 
19.1 hours and charged $4,106.50 working on Plaintiffs' opposition to Steve's motion to amend. The 
legal argument in Steve's memorandum in support of the motion to amend is one page long. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants Motion for L.eave to Amend Answer and 
Counter-Complaint, filed December 24, 2013. Plaintiffs' legal argument is seven pages long. Opposition 
to Motion for L.eave to Amend Answer and Counter Complaint, filed January 8, 2014. Further, a motion to 
amend is an extremely routine motion that is easy to respond to. There was simply no reason to 
spend almost twenty hours working on the opposition. 
DATE DESCRIPTION ATIY HRS RATE AMT 
Dec-30-13 Review and analyze motion to amend and begin JCB 0.70 $215.00 $150.50 
formulating counterarguments. 
Research case law regarding denials of motions to JCB 1.3 $~15.00 $279.50 
amend. 
Begin drafting opposition to Motion for Leave to ]CB 2.0 $215.00 $430.00 
.Amend. 
Dec-31-13 Continue drafting Opposition to Motion to .Amend JCB 3.7 $215.00 $795.50 
Jan-02-14 Continue drafting Opposition to Defendants' JCB 3.9 $215.00 $838.50 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Counter-
Complaint. 
Research case law regarding futility of amendments. _JCB .3 $215.00 $64.50 
Research case law regarding moving to amend to JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
conform with evidence without providing any new 
evidence. 
Jan-03-14 Continue drafting Opposition to Defendants' ]CB 2.9 $215.00 $623.50 
Motion to Amend. 
Jan-06-14 Continue working on Opposition to Motion to ]CB 0.20 $215.00 $43.00 
Amend. 
Jan-07-14. Continue drafting Opposition to Defendants' ]CB 0.70 $215.00 $150.50 
Motion to Amend. 
Jan-08-14 Continue drafting Opposition to Motion to Amend. JCB 2.50 $215.00 $537.50 
Draft Wrona Affidavit to include with Opposition JCB 0.40 $215.00 $86.00 
to Motion to Amend. 
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119.10 I $4,106.50 
The time spent and amount billed for researching statutes of limitations and !aches also serve 
as an example of inefficiency. These topics are quite simple. There are very specific statutes 
governing the time in which claims may be brought. Further, !aches is not a difficult subject to 
master. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' attorneys, as shown below, spent 14.4 and charged $3,096.00 
researching them. This is unreasonable. 
DATE DESCRIPTION ATIY HRS RATE AMT 
A.pr-12-13 Research case law regarding statute of JCB .9 $215.00 $193.50 
limitations as bar to lien enforcement. 
Research defense of laches as possible grounds JCB 1.1 $215.00 $236.50 
for motion to dismiss. 
Jun-27-13 Begin researching Christensen's statute of JCB 1.9 $215.00 $408.50 
limitations arguments 
Jul-01-13 Continue researching case law regarding ]CB 1.9 $215.00 $408.50 
Christensen's statute of limitations argument 
regarding removal of the lien 
Research statute of limitations case law as it JCB .3 $215.00 $64.50 
applies to injunctive relief. 
Continue researching statute of limitations as ]CB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
applied to declarato.rv jud ent action. 
Jul-02-13 Conduct detailed legal analysis regarding the JCB 4.2 $215.00 $903.00 
statute of limitations as it applies to declaratory 
judgment claim. 
Jul-03-13 Continue researching interplay between JCB 1.5 $215.00 $322.50 
declaratory judgment cause of action and 
statute of limitations. 
Research elements of permanent injunction and JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
interplay with statute of limitations. 
Research elements of promissory estoppel and ]CB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
interplay with statute of limitations. 
Research wrongful lien claim and interplay JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
with statute of limitations. 
Jul-23-13 Research case law asserted by Defendants regarding JCB .40 $215.00 $86.00 
statute of limitations not beginning until sale of 
property to third oartv. 
Jul-24-13 Research case law supporting argument against JCB .20 $215.00 $43.00 
Defendants' statute of limitations argument. 
TOTALS 14.4 $3,096.00 
Plaintiffs also conducted discovery in an extremely inefficient manner. Again, this is not a 
difficult case. Additionally, in addition to initial disclosures, each side only sent the other one set of 
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discovery requests each, and only one deposition was conducted. See Docket entries for 05-29-2013, 
06-26-2013, 07-01-2013, 07-11-2013, and 08-08-2013. But, as illustrated below, by spending too long 
preparing disclosures, discovery requests, discovery responses, by duplicating work, and by spending 
excessive amounts of time doing things that their clients or legal assistants should have been doing, 
Plaintiffs' attorneys spent 39.3 hours and charged $9,678.00 working on discovery. 
DATE DESCRIPTION AITY HRS RATE AMT 
Apr-15-13 Begin drafting Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures as JCB 1.10 $215.00 $236.50 
requii:ed bv Civil Rule 26. 
Apr-17-13 Continue drafting Plaintiffs, Initial Disclosures as JCB .4 $215.00 $86.00 
requii:ed bv the Civil Rules of Procedtll'e I 
Apr-18-13 Compile and review documents to be produced with JCB 1.30 $215.00 $279.50 
initial disclostll'es. 
Email Charlie to follow up on possible additional JCB .1 $215.00 $279.50 
documents 
Teleconference with Charlie. JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Apr-19-13 Continue drafting and compiling Plaintiffs' Initial JCB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
Disclosures 
Apr-20-13 Working on initial disclostll'es; working on discovery JEW .4 $350.00 $140.00 
Apr-22-13 Finalize initial disclosures JCB .10 $215.00 $21.50 
Coordinate filing and service of initial ]CB .10 $215.00 $21.50 
disclosures. 
Draft Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs' Initial AS .80 $75.00 $60.00 
Disclostll'es; assemble documents to produce with 
Initial Disclosures. 
Apr-30-13 Check on possibility of issuing written discovery ]CB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
requests 
May-09-13 Follow-up on whether opposing counsel ever ]CB .4 $215.00 $86.00 
submitted initial disclosures 
May-10-13 Research timing requirements associated with JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
issuin~ discovery requests. 
Begin drafting First Set of Discovery Requests to ]CB .5 $215.00 $107.50 
Defendants. 
May-13-13 Continue drafting First Set of Discovery JCB 3.9 $215.00 $838.50 
Requests to Defendants. 
May-14-13 Continue drafting First Set of Discovery JCB .4 $215.00 $86.00 
Requests to Christensen et al. 
May-29-13 Coordinate with AS to issue discovery requests ]CB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
to Christensen et al. 
Draft Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs First AS .5 $75.00 $37.50 
Set of Discovery Requests, use court's ECF 
system for timely filing of First Set of 
Discovery Requests and service on opposing 
counsel. 
Jul-01-13 Attention to email from]. Bowman re: BCJ .5 $100.00 $50.00 
deposition notice for Christensen; prepare 
notice of deposition re: same. 
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Jul-26-13 Continue drafting responses to discovery requests JCB 1.10 $215.00 $236.50 
from Christensen et al. 
Jun-27-13 Revie,;1,· initial disclosures submitted by defendant; JEW .5 $350.00 $175.00 
working w /Tared on a deposition strategy r.s1 
Review and analyze discovery responses from JCB .8 $215.00 $172.00 
Christensen et al. 
Email correspondence with opposing counsel ]CB .3 $215.00 $64.50 
re2arding deposition dates for Steve Christensen 
Jul-01-13 Attention to email from]. Bowman re: deposition BC] .5 $100.00 $50.00 
notice for Christensen; prepare notice of deposition 
re: same. 
Jul-08-13 Begin identifying necessary deposition topics for ]CB .3 $215.00 $64.50 
Christensen Deposition 
Jul-10-13 Continue working on preparing for deposition of ]CB 1.70 $215.00 $365.50 
Steve Christensen. 
Jul-11-13 Prepare for Christensen deposition; working on JEW 3.6 $350.00 $1,260.00 
documents; working on outline of deposition; work 
w/ Jared; work w/ Charlie f3.61 
Work withJEW on deposition strategy. JCB .4 $215.00 $86.00 
Compile potential deposition exhibits and draft ]CB 2.6 $215.00 $559.00 
outline topic and documents for Christensen's 
Deposition. 
Finalize Christensen deposition scheduling. JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Begin reviewing and analyzing Christensen's ]CB .3 $215.00 $21.50 
discoverv requests. 
Email Christensen's discovery requests to Charlie ]CB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
for review and answers. 
Jul-12-13 Early morning deposition preparation; travel to JEW 5.0 $350.00 $1,750.00 
Draper to depose Christensen; follow up work after 
deposition; teleconference after deposition on lease 
and other issues (7:00 am to 2:00 pm actual, charge 5 
hours)f5.0] 
Assist in last minute preparations for Christensen's ]CB .6 $215.00 $129.00 
deposition. 
Work with JEW on results of deposition. JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Draft Initial Responses to Christensen's Discovery CST 1.00 $75.00 
Requests 
Jul-18-13 Begin drafting responses to Discovery Requests ]CB 1.1 $215.00 $236.50 
from opposing counsel 
Continue drafting responses to discovery requests JCB 1.1 $215.00 $236.50 
from Christensen et al. 
Jul-30-13 Review transcript of Christensen deposition; 
correspond w / Charlie on same f .41 
Aug-02-13 Working on Charlie's comments to Steve JEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
Christensen deposition f .31 
Aue:-05-13 Obtain transcript of Christensen's deposition. JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Working with JEW on discovery responses and ]CB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
possible additional requests. 
Review and analyze transcript of Christensen's ]CB .8 $215.00 $172.00 
Deposition. 
Review and analyze comments from Charlie on ]CB .2 $215.00 $43.00 
Christensen's Deposition. 
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Begin compiling and preparing documents to ]CB 1.00 $215.00 $215.00 
produce in .response to requests from Christensen et 
al. 
Aug-06-13 Working on discovery responses f.91 JEW .9 $350.00 $315 
Continue drafting .responses to discovery ]CB 1.2 $215.00 $258.00 
requests from Christensen et al. 
Aug-07-13 Continue working on responses to discovery JCB .50 $215.00 $107.50 
requests from Christensen et al. 
Editing inte.croirato.rv responses r.31 TEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
Work with JEW on additional discovery requests to JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
Christensen et al. 
Email opposing counsel regarding .review of JCB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
complete file. 
Review and analyze response from opposing counsel ]CB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
reira.rding review of complete file. 
Email draft of responses to Charlie for review ]CB .1 $215.00 $21.50 
before submitting the same to opposing counsel. 
Aug-08-13 Final edit to mte.crogatory responses f.31 JEW .3 $350.00 $105.00 
Finalize responses to discovery requests from ]CB 0.50 $215.00 $107.50 
Christensen et al. 
TOTALS 39.3 hrs $9,678.00 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reduce the jury's verdict and its judgment to $20,000.00. The jury 
improperly awarded $11,321.S0_in attorney fees that were incurred working on unsuccessful claims, 
unsuccessful motions, and claims unrelated to removal of the lien. Further, Plaintiffs failed to prove 
that $32,594.93 in costs and attorney fees were actually necessary to remove the lien because they 
failed to allocate them. Finally, the remaining attorney fees are unreasonable due to the inefficient 
manner in which Plaintiffs' attorneys prosecuted this case. 
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Steve respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce the jury's verdict and amend the judgment against him to $20,000 in damages. Alternatively, 
Steve requests that the Court award him a new trial. 
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DA1ED 19th clay of January, 2015. 
CHRISTENSEN CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC 
Isl Craig L. Pankratz 
David M. Corbett 
Craig L. Pankratz 
Attom~s far Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT, OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL has been sent via electronic filing on this 19th 
day of January, 2015, to: 
Wrona Law Firm, P.C. 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Jared C. Bowman 
17 45 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City UT 84060 
Facsimile: (435) 649-59559 
Is I Craig L. Pankratz 
AN EMPLOYEE OF CHRISTENSEN CORBETT & P .Al\JXRATZ, P. C 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-Sli~\Hl'T 
2015 FEB 13 AH II= 2lt 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT hJ~ 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY. STATE OF UTA~ILED ev-:-1 Y.;..J~..,,__--
CHARLES C. REHN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; and STEVE S. 
CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 130500115 
February 13, 2015 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, or Motion for New Trial ('The Motionst), filed by Defendants Steve S. 
Christensen and Steve S. Christensen, P.C. tDefendants11). The Motion is fully briefed and 
ready for decision. No party has requested oral argument 
This matter was tried to a jury in December 2014 on one claim: Plaintiff's claim for 
slander of title. After hearing the evidence and argument, the jury determined that Defendants 
had acted with malice in recordin9 a lien against Plaintiff's home, and that Plaintiff had incurred 
$77,752.29 in attorneys• fees that were reasonably necessary to remove clouds from the title to 
his property. See Special Verdict Form. By the Motion, Defendants ask the Court to reduce the 
jurys determination of,damages from $77,752.29 to $20,000.00. For the reasons stated.below, 
the Court DENIES the Motion. 
Because "it is the jury's exclusive function to weigh the evidence, a jury verdict should 
not be regarded lightly nor overturned without good and sufficient reason.0 See ASC Utah, Inc. 
v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC .• 2013 UT 24, 1f18, 309 P.3d 201. Indeed, a trial court 11may grant 
a JNOV motion only if there is no basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences which 
could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination. 0 Id. 
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REHN v. CHRISTENSEN et al. Case No. 130500115 
In the Motion, Defendants argue that the amount the jury awarded was too high, 
because they assert that this amount includes fees incurred In litigating unsuccessful motions or 
tangential aspects of the litigation that were not directly related to clearing the . title of the 
property. However, in this case, the jury was instructed on the law, and was expressly informed 
as follows: 
In slander of title cases, attorney fees may constitute recoverable damages if the 
fees incurred were reasonably necessary to remove clouds from a party's title to 
property. For instance, if it is reasonably necessary for a property owner to file a 
lawsuit in · order to remedy defects in his title resulting· from a s1anderous 
statement affecting his title, any fees and costs incurred in that lawsuit, · up to the 
point in the lawsuit when title is cleared, that were reasonably necessary to 
remove the clouds on title are recoverable as damages in a slander of title case. 
See Jury Instruction No. 36. Defendants did not object to this instruction, and even now do not 
take issue with it. Thus, the jury was told what their task was: to examine the evidence 
presented by Plaintiff with regard to his claimed fees, and to analyze Plaintiff's damages claims 
through the lens of determining what portion of the claimed fees. if any, were 0reasonably 
necessary to remove clouds from a party's title to property." 
At trial, Plaintiff presented evidence of his claimed damages, not only through 
documents (the bill~ng records were entered into evidence) but also through the testimony of 
Jared Bowman, an attorney at the Wrona Law Firm who was knowledgeable about the fees and 
what they were incurred for. Mr. Bowman testified that all of the claimed fees, totaHng 
$77~ 752.29, were reasonably incurred in clearing tHle. Defendants did not call a damages 
witness of their own (e.g., an attorney expert to testify as to reasonableness of fees Incurred) 
but, rather, chose to rely on a vigorous cross-examination of Mr. Bowman through use of the 
billing records. The Court does not have at its disposal a transcript of Defendants' counsel's 
cross-examination of Mr. Bowman, but the Court certainly recalls vigorous cross-examination on 
many of the ·issues raised in the Motion (e.g., that some of the claimed fees were Incurred for 
other things not directly related to clearing title, and that some of the claimed fees were bloated 
and unreasonable), and certainly recalls Defendants' counsel making many of the same· 
2 
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REHN v. CHRISTENSEN et al. Case No. 130500115 
arguments during closing argument The jury had the opportunity to listen to the testimony and 
arguments and had the opportunity i·n the jury room during deliberation to pore over the billing 
records. There is no question that the jury's award of $77,752.29 was supported by at least 
some substantial evidence, and there is therefore no basis for the court to overturn it on a JNOV 
motion or on a motion grounded in Utah R Civ. P. 59(a)(6) (which allows a trial court to grant a 
new trial if there is an "insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict"). 
Defendants further ask the Court to engage in an analysis of whether the fees ·were 
reasonable, and whether the fees were properly allocated to the successful slander of title claim 
(as opposed to other claims upon which Plaintiff was unsuccessful). However, Defendants 
misperceive the nature of the post.trial inquiry that the Court is allowed to engage in. This is not 
a case where the Court is assessing the amount of fees based on an award of attomey fees in a 
"prevailing party' context. Certainly, in that context, it is up to the Court to determine 
reasonableness of feest and up to the Court to make sure that fees• are properly allocated 
between successful and unsuccessful claims. But in this cont~~. where the ju,:y was 
specifiCS,ly asked to engage in precisely that exercise after proper instruction1 it does not fall to 
the Court to s·econd-guess the jury1s decision ih that regard, unless ttie ju_ry's de~ion was one 
for which "th~re is no basis in th~ evidence. includi_ng reasonable jnferences which could be 
drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination." See ASC Utah. 2013 UT 24, 1[18.1 And 
as discussed above, this case is not that sort of case. 
Finally, Defendants ask ~is Court to apply the principles . set forth in Colquhoun v. 
Webber1 684 A2d 405 (Me. 1996), a case in which the appellate court reversed a trial court's 
damages award (imposed after a bench trial) in a slander of title case. There, the trial court 
awarded damages In the form of all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the entire slander of 
title lawsuit The appellate court reversed, stating that ihe prevailing party in a slander of title 
1 Plaintiff rightly points out that It was Defendants-and not Plaintiff-who demanded a jury trial and 
refused to waive that demand at pretrial, thereby making the conscious decision to submit these issues to 
thejury and not to the Court · 
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REHN v. CHRISTENSEN et al. Case No. 130500115 
action may recover as special damages those attorney fees and expenses accruing from 
removing the cloud on the title,11 an amount that is not necessarily the same (and usually is not 
the same) as the entire amount of fees and costs incurred in the whole case. Id. at 413. 
However, in this case (as noted above}, the Court and the jury have already applied these 
principles, exactly as set forth in Webber. Before allowing the damages evidence to go to the 
jury, the Court made sure during pretrial proceedings that the damages evidence Plaintiff would 
present to the jury was not simply all attorneys' fees incurred in the whole case ~ rather, just 
those fees that were incurred pnor to the Court's summary judgment ruling clearing title. Even 
after trial, the Court rejected a post-trial request from Plaintiff to award fees incurred in the entire 
case. See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing 
Party, dated January 21, 2015. Most importantly, as discussed already above, the Court 
instructed the jury to award only those fees reasonably incurred in clearing title, a point which 
was vigorously argued by counsel. 
For all of these reasons, the Court finds no basis to disturb the jury's verdict, regardless 
of whether Defendants' Motion is viewed as a JNOV motion pursuant to Rule 52 or a motion for 
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. There was competent evidence in the record to support the 
jurts verdieli and the Court will not disturb it on post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Motion Is 
DENIED. 111is Rufing and Order is the order of the Court, and no further writing is necessary to 
effectuate this decision. 
DA TED this f 3 \'k day of February, 2015 . 
• 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
peo~le for case 130500115 by the method and on the date specified. 
MANUAL EMAIL: JARED C BOWMAN bowman®Wgdlawfirm. com 
MANUAL EMAIL: DAVID M CORBETT dmc@ccplawyers.com 
MANUAL EMAIL: CRAIG L PANKRATZ clp@ccplawyers.com 
MANUAL EMAIL: JOSEPH B WRONA wrona®wgdlawfirrn.com 
02/13/2015 /s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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David M. Corbett (U.S.B. No. 13946) 
dmc@ccplawvers.com 
Craig L. Pankratz ru.S.B. No. 12194) 
Christensen Corbett & Pankratz, pile 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
Attorneys for Steve S. Christensen, Steve S. Christensen, P.C., Christensen Corbett & Pankratz, 
P LLC, and Hirschi Christensen, P LLC 
In The Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Summit County, State of Utah 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, an individual; 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; HENROID, 
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah 
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; 
IDRSCID CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; and 
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO 
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. 
Defendants. 
s 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as 
Prevailing Party 
Civil No. 130500115 
Judge Ryan Harris 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as 
Prevailing Party. The Court held a hearing on January 8, 2015 to discuss the motion. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Joesph Wrona, and DefendcfrtQ~~Rf,l-Me4lted by David Corbett. PlaintifFs 03721 
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asserted three grounds for an award of attorney fees: (I) through the retainer agreement between Mr. 
Rehn and Mr. Christensen and his law finn; (2) by virtue of Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826; and (3) 
through the Court's inherent equitable powers to award attorney fees when required by justice. 
Having received the arguments of the parties, and finding itself fully advised of the premises, the 
Court makes the following ruling: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. On October 24, 1997, Charles Rehn ("Rehn") signed a retainer agreement (" 1997 Retainer") 
with Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC"). Paragraph 15 of the retainer agreement 
stated, "In the event legal action is taken to enforce this agreement the law of Utah shall 
apply and the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees." 
2. Plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint on February 15, 2013. The complaint asserted five 
causes of action: ( 1) A declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that the lien was 
unenforceable and void ab initio; (2) A permanent injunction prohibiting efforts to enforce 
the lien; (3) Slander of Title; (4) Estoppel; and (5) Wrongful Lien. 
3. In their counter-complaint, Defendants sought enforcement of the lien. Defendants cited to 
the 1997 Retainer as the basis for the amounts owed and in support of their claim that Rehn 
had consented to the lien against his property. The counter-complaint included a request for 
attorney fees in prosecuting and defending the matter pursuant to the 1997 Retainer. 
4. On January 22, 2014, the Court entered its Order on Summary Judgment Motions. The Court 
granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on his first cause of action ( declaratory judgment) 
and determined that the second cause of action (injunctive relief) was moot. The Court 
denied summary judgment to either party on the slander of title cause of action because of 
the factual issues related to Defendants' intent when the lien was recorded. The Court denied 
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summary judgment on the estoppel cause of action because of factual issues. And the Court 
dismissed the Wrongful Lien cause of action. Finally, the Court dismissed Defendants' 
counterclaim. 
5. The parties then proceeded to trial on the Slander of Title and Estoppel causes of action. 
However, after trial concluded, Plaintiffs' withdrew their Estoppel claims. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. Generally, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or contract. Eldridge v. 
Farnsworth, 2007 UT App. 243, 151, 166 P.3d 639. A party may recover attorney fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 where that party prevails in a civil action based upon a 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, which 
writing contains an attorneys' fee provision that allows at least one party to recover attorneys' 
fees. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. As described by the Utah Supreme Court, "an action is 
'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation assert[s] the writing 
enforceability as basis for recovery." Hooban v. Unicity lnten., Inc., 2012 UT 40,122,285 
P.3d 766 (citing Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ,I 15, 160 P.3d 1041). If provided by 
contract, they can only be awarded in "in strict accordance with the terms of the contract." 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). For this reason, a trial court must separate fees 
related to contractual claims from those fees related to other claims "for which there is no 
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 
1992). 
2. The language of the contract in question only allowed a party to recover attorney fees in a 
legal action brought to enforce the terms of the contract. The slander of title claim was not 
brought to enforce the terms of the contract and was not otherwise based upon the contract. 
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Neither party had a contractual right to recover attorney fees associated with prosecuting or 
defending against the slander of title claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover any fees for 
their prosecution for the slander of title cause of action pursuant to the contract or Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-5-826. 
3. A court may, however, exercise its inherent authority to award attorney fees where it is 
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity. The Court, however, declines to exercise its 
equitable powers in this case. Although the jury found that the Defendants acted with malice 
when they recorded the subject lien, the Court does not find that the facts of this case 
distinguish it from other slander of title cases such that justice requires an award of attorney 
fees in addition to those already awarded by the jury, which the jury determined to be 
reasonably necessary to remove the cloud oftitle from Mr. Rehn's property. Absent such 
facts to distinguish this case from other slander of title of case, Plaintiffs argument would 
allow a party to recover all attorney fees in every slander of title case. The Court is not 
willing to exercise its discretion in that manner. 
Wherefore, premises considered, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party is denied. 
This order is signed and entered of record as indicated on the top of the first page. 
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